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Cody J. Jacobs† 
As the story is traditionally told, the minimum contacts test introduced in 
International Shoe v Washington freed personal jurisdiction from the dark age of 
territorialism and gave courts the flexibility to expand the scope of personal 
jurisdiction to keep pace with modern society. While scholars have critiqued the 
minimum contacts test on a number of grounds, the narrative that the Territorial 
Model was inherently problematic—and that Shoe was a step in the right direction—
has gone largely unchallenged. 
This Article challenges that narrative and argues for a return to the Territorial 
Model. While Shoe is traditionally cast as a step toward expanding personal juris-
diction, the minimum contacts test has now become a greater restraint on state power 
than the territorial regime that preceded it. This constriction of state power has been 
coupled with a doctrine that has become increasingly confusing and malleable, un-
moored from coherent constitutional and theoretical foundations, and unable to re-
spond to economic and technological changes. The Territorial Model, by contrast, 
gave states numerous tools to assert jurisdiction over out-of-state defendants, includ-
ing quasi in rem jurisdiction, consent statutes, and constructive presence. The rules 
governing personal jurisdiction were relatively straightforward and relied on objec-
tive criteria that were easily ascertainable with minimal litigation costs. Once the 
mythology surrounding personal jurisdiction doctrine is dismantled, the original 
wisdom of the Territorial Model, and the benefits of returning to it, are clear. 
 
 † Visiting Assistant Professor, Chicago-Kent College of Law. Thanks to Stephen 
Sachs, Patrick Borchers, Alex Boni-Saenz, Mark Rosen, Chris Schmidt, Mike Gentithes, 
Lori Andrews, Richard Wright, Greg Reilly, and Harold Krent for their helpful comments 
on this Article. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Brent Tyrrell worked for railroads all his life.1 When he was 
working for BNSF, a multibillion-dollar company and one of the 
largest railroads in North America,2 Brent developed terminal 
kidney cancer, allegedly as a result of his on-the-job exposure to 
harmful industrial chemicals.3 He died at the age of forty-nine.4 
His widow, Kelli Tyrrell, sued BNSF in Montana, a state where 
BNSF had dozens of offices, a manufacturing facility, over two 
 
 1 See Brent Thomas Tyrrell | 1962–2011 | Obituary (Minnehaha Funeral Home), 
archived at http://perma.cc/TF35-Y47U (“Tyrrell Obituary”). 
 2 See Robert Wright, The Biggest North American Railroads *1 (Financial Times, 
Aug 22, 2011), archived at http://perma.cc/83JF-QPEQ.  
 3 Brief for Respondents, BNSF Railway Co v Tyrrell, No 16-405, *7 (US filed Mar 
29, 2017) (available on Westlaw at 2017 WL 1192088) (“Brief for Respondents”). 
 4 See Tyrrell Obituary (cited in note 1). 
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thousand miles of railroad tracks, and over two thousand employ-
ees.5 In the year preceding Kelli’s lawsuit, BNSF received over 
$1.7 billion from its operations in Montana.6 BNSF also was reg-
istered to do business in Montana and, as a condition of obtaining 
that registration, had appointed an agent to receive service of pro-
cess there.7 
Despite all of this, the Supreme Court ruled Montana courts 
could not obtain personal jurisdiction over BNSF.8 This result is 
just the latest in a series of cases going back several decades that 
have applied International Shoe Co v Washington’s9 minimum 
contacts test to narrow the ability of states to assert personal ju-
risdiction over out-of-state defendants.10 Nevertheless, a myth 
persists in personal jurisdiction scholarship that Shoe repre-
sented the ushering in of a more flexible jurisdictional test that 
was more appropriate for the realities of America’s changing 
economy and gave states more authority to assert jurisdiction 
over foreign corporations.11 Conversely, academics and courts of-
ten deride the era predating Shoe as the “bad old days” when 
courts labored under the yoke of inscrutable and outdated juris-
dictional rules that allowed corporations to evade jurisdiction 
while conducting business across state lines.12 
 
 5 Brief for Respondents at *5–6 (cited in note 3); Plaintiff’s Response to Defendant’s 
Motion to Dismiss, Nelson v BNSF Railway Co, No 11-0417, *2–3 (D Mont filed Apr 15, 
2014) (available on Westlaw at 2014 WL 12721216). 
 6 Brief for Respondents at *5–6 (cited in note 3). 
 7 See id at *5. 
 8 See BNSF Railway Co v Tyrrell, 137 S Ct 1549, 1559 (2017). 
 9 326 US 310 (1945). 
 10 See Part I.B. 
 11 See, for example, Eric Schepard, The Battle for the Soul of International Shoe: Why 
the Author of International Shoe Would Condemn the Nicastro Plurality for Hijacking His 
Legacy of Judicial Restraint, 32 Quinnipiac L Rev 353, 358–59 (2014) (noting the Shoe 
Court’s “desire to expand the jurisdictional reach of the states beyond the Pennoyer frame-
work”); Donald L. Doernberg, Resoling International Shoe, 2 Tex A&M L Rev 247, 260 
(2014) (“[International Shoe] expanded the reach of personal jurisdiction beyond the 
purely territorial.”); Patrick J. Borchers, The Death of the Constitutional Law of Personal 
Jurisdiction: From Pennoyer to Burnham and Back Again, 24 UC Davis L Rev 19, 55 
(1990) (“International Shoe signalled a broader reach for state courts and an era of argu-
ably fairer results.”). See also McGee v International Life Insurance Co, 355 US 220, 222 
(1957) (“Looking back over [the history of personal jurisdiction] a trend is clearly discern-
ible toward expanding the permissible scope of state jurisdiction over foreign corporations 
and other nonresidents.”). 
 12 See, for example, J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd v Nicastro, 564 US 873, 894 (2011) 
(Ginsburg dissenting) (“[T]he splintered majority today ‘turn[s] the clock back to the days 
before modern long-arm statutes when a manufacturer, to avoid being haled into court 
where a user is injured, need only Pilate-like wash its hands of a product by having inde-
pendent distributors market it.’”), quoting Russell J. Weintraub, A Map out of the Personal 
Jurisdiction Labyrinth, 28 UC Davis L Rev 531, 555 (1995); Schepard, 32 Quinnipiac L 
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This Article demonstrates that this traditional narrative has 
it exactly backward. The jurisdictional framework that preceded 
Shoe, which I call the Territorial Model, was neither as restrictive 
nor as confusing as it has been made out to be. The Territorial 
Model set out clear rules that respected states’ sovereign author-
ity over the people and things within their borders, but it also 
gave plaintiffs a number of helpful tools for bringing suit against 
out-of-state defendants, including quasi in rem jurisdiction, reg-
istration and implied consent statutes, and the constructive pres-
ence doctrine. Shoe, on the other hand, eviscerated all of those 
tools and replaced them with a minimum contacts test that has 
increasingly constrained the jurisdictional reach of state courts. 
Indeed, Kelli would have had a much better chance of obtaining 
personal jurisdiction over BNSF had her lawsuit been filed in 
1914 instead of 2014 because she could have relied on either quasi 
in rem jurisdiction or BNSF’s compliance with Montana’s regis-
tration statute.13 
To be sure, the Court’s development of the minimum contacts 
test has been met with plenty of scholarly critique. Commentators 
have criticized the doctrine for being undertheorized, incon-
sistent, and indecipherable.14 Recently, some scholars have also 
begun to recognize that the minimum contacts test, at least in its 
current form, places an undue burden on plaintiffs attempting to 
sue out-of-state defendants.15 Yet no one has recognized the most 
 
Rev at 356–57 (cited in note 11) (“Unsurprisingly, the Court struggled to define or apply 
the concepts of ‘implied consent,’ ‘corporate presence,’ and ‘doing business,’ which scholars 
pre-International Shoe savaged for producing unpredictable and contradictory results.”); 
Christopher D. Cameron and Kevin R. Johnson, Death of a Salesman? Forum Shopping 
and Outcome Determination under International Shoe, 28 UC Davis L Rev 769, 782–83 
(1995) (“[T]erritoriality proved too inflexible a tool for a developing national economy. . . . 
Besides increasing the potential for nonresidents to cause injury in a state, these develop-
ments made it harder to catch up with the people whose conduct created mischief in the 
forum state. Wrongdoers could simply avoid setting foot there.”). See also Stephen E. 
Sachs, Pennoyer Was Right, 95 Tex L Rev 1249, 1251–52 (2017) (collecting sources critiqu-
ing Pennoyer). 
 13 The Supreme Court did not rule on the argument that BNSF consented to suit 
through the registration statute. See BNSF, 137 S Ct at 1559.  For the reasons explained 
in Part I.B, consent statutes are unlikely to survive under the Court’s current conception 
of the minimum contacts test. 
 14 See, for example, Todd David Peterson, The Timing of Minimum Contacts, 79 Geo 
Wash L Rev 101, 101–02 & nn 2–3 (2010) (collecting sources critiquing the Supreme 
Court’s approach to personal jurisdiction doctrine); Charles W. “Rocky” Rhodes, Liberty, 
Substantive Due Process, and Personal Jurisdiction, 82 Tulane L Rev 567, 568 (2007) 
(“Everyone’s a critic. Or at least it appears that way when reading academic commentary 
on personal jurisdiction’s constitutional boundaries. Article after article blasts the United 
States Supreme Court for creating an incoherent, chaotic doctrine.”). 
 15 See, for example, Schepard, 32 Quinnipiac L Rev at 380 (cited in note 11). 
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obvious, if radical, solution to these problems—a return to the 
Territorial Model.16 
This Article makes that argument. Besides expanding the 
ability of states to assert personal jurisdiction over out-of-state 
corporations, returning to the Territorial Model would have 
several other practical and theoretical benefits. The Territorial 
Model’s rules-based system would provide litigants with much 
clearer guidelines about personal jurisdiction’s boundaries and 
actually keep the promise of allowing potential defendants to 
structure their primary conduct to avoid personal jurisdiction in 
a particular state.17 And the replacement of long-arm statutes 
with registration and implied consent statutes would return state 
legislatures to a central role in defining the scope of courts’ 
jurisdiction. This would allow for much greater flexibility in 
dealing with technological developments that impact the way 
people interact across state and national boundaries. Finally, the 
Territorial Model would at last give personal jurisdiction doctrine 
a clear animating principle that is in accord with the original 
meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. 
Part I.A of this Article re-examines the history of personal 
jurisdiction doctrine in order to demonstrate that the pre-Shoe 
era of personal jurisdiction doctrine was much more expansive 
and clearer than the critics recognize. Part I.B of this Article 
demonstrates that the post-Shoe era has been marked by a nearly 
uniform movement toward greater restraints on the ability of 
states to exercise personal jurisdiction, all while creating a doc-
trine that ironically suffers from many of the same vagueness and 
flexibility deficiencies the critics ascribe to the pre-Shoe era. 
Part II outlines the Territorial Model’s benefits over the status 
quo. Part III describes how the Territorial Model would apply to 
litigation involving the internet and product distribution 
chains—major personal jurisdiction issues that are currently vex-
ing the courts. 
 
 16 Professor Stephen Sachs has argued for returning to the Pennoyer era in the gen-
eral sense that courts ought to derive personal jurisdiction doctrine from international 
customary law, but he explicitly disclaimed any desire to “reset[ ] the clock to 1878” and 
noted that, because “[g]eneral law is customary law, and custom can change over time . . . 
today’s generally accepted standards of jurisdiction [may] look more like International 
Shoe than Pennoyer.” Sachs, 95 Tex L Rev at 1255, 1319 (cited in note 12). I, on the other 
hand, do advocate turning back the clock—though perhaps just to 1944 rather than 1878. 
See Parts I.B and II. 
 17 See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp v Woodson, 444 US 286, 297 (1980) (“The Due 
Process Clause . . . gives a degree of predictability to the legal system that allows potential 
defendants to structure their primary conduct with some minimum assurance as to where 
that conduct will and will not render them liable to suit.”). 
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I.  DEBUNKING PERSONAL JURISDICTION MYTHOLOGY 
The popular story of personal jurisdiction has been famously 
“retold . . . thousand[s] of times” in law review articles and 1L civil 
procedure classrooms alike.18 Like any good story, it has heroes 
and villains. The story traditionally starts with Pennoyer v Neff19 
and its holding that the Due Process Clause restricts state 
assertions of personal jurisdiction to those based on the 
defendant’s consent or on service of process while the defendant 
is physically present in a state.20 The territorial power–based 
rules of Pennoyer, we are told, make sense only in light of the 
“horse and buggy” economy of the time when travel between 
states was rare and difficult.21 The inherent flaws in this model 
became apparent when the economy began to modernize over the 
next several decades and business across state lines became more 
common.22 Courts tried to keep up with this expansion through a 
web of complicated exceptions to the territorial model that led to 
confusing and contradictory outcomes.23 
Then, just when all hope seemed lost, along came our story’s 
hero, Shoe. Shoe discarded the inconvenient formalist fictions of 
the territorial era in favor of a new system “based on fairness and 
rationality.”24 This new system—the minimum contacts test—ex-
panded the power of states to allow their citizens to sue foreign 
corporations that cause them harm in the newly nationalized and 
increasingly globalized economy.25 
The next two Sections challenge this narrative. First, I 
demonstrate that the pre-Shoe law was not nearly as restrictive 
or indecipherable as the critics suggest. Rather, that framework 
empowered states to exert the full measure of their territorial 
 
 18 See Russell J. Weintraub, Due Process Limitations on the Personal Jurisdiction of 
State Courts: Time for Change, 63 Or L Rev 485, 487 (1984). 
 19 95 US 714 (1878). 
 20 Id at 733. 
 21 See, for example, Philip B. Kurland, The Supreme Court, the Due Process Clause 
and the In Personam Jurisdiction of State Courts: From Pennoyer to Denckla: A Review, 
25 U Chi L Rev 569, 573 (1958). 
 22 See, for example, Douglas D. McFarland, Drop the Shoe: A Law of Personal Juris-
diction, 68 Mo L Rev 753, 755–56 (2003); Cameron and Johnson, 28 UC Davis L Rev at 
782 (cited in note 12). 
 23 See, for example, Cameron and Johnson, 28 UC Davis L Rev at 785–86 (cited in 
note 12); Borchers, 24 UC Davis L Rev at 52 (cited in note 11). 
 24 Harold L. Korn, The Choice-of-Law Revolution: A Critique, 83 Colum L Rev 772, 
783 (1983). See also, for example, Borchers, 24 UC Davis L Rev at 54 (cited in note 11) 
(“International Shoe has been widely heralded as the great ‘liberator’ of personal jurisdic-
tion from the formalisms of Pennoyer.”). 
 25 See note 11 and accompanying text. 
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power and allowed state legislators to take the lead in crafting 
new jurisdictional rules to fit new technological and economic de-
velopments. Second, I show that the post-Shoe era has not ex-
panded the reach of personal jurisdiction and, instead, has con-
tracted state power into a husk of what would have been available 
before Shoe. 
A. Personal Jurisdiction before 1945: No Shoe, No Problem 
The real story of personal jurisdiction in the United States 
does not begin with Pennoyer. Instead, it starts with a line of 
cases decided under the Full Faith and Credit Clause that pre-
dates the Fourteenth Amendment’s ratification.26 In these cases, 
the Supreme Court held that a defendant could resist the inter-
state recognition of a judgment by arguing that the state entering 
the judgment lacked personal jurisdiction over the defendant.27 
The rules for determining whether personal jurisdiction was pre-
sent were fairly simple—a state could properly assert personal 
jurisdiction over a defendant only when the defendant either con-
sented to personal jurisdiction or was served while physically pre-
sent in the forum.28 The Court found the source of these rules in 
principles of international law on the recognition of judgments.29 
Specifically, the Court held that, just as foreign countries may 
“disregard a judgment merely against the person, where he has 
not been served with process nor had a day in court,” so may a 
state disregard another state’s judgment entered without service 
or consent because such a judgment is “an illegitimate assump-
tion of power” by the state purporting to render it.30 
In Pennoyer, fewer than ten years after the Fourteenth 
Amendment was ratified, the Court for the first time used that 
amendment’s Due Process Clause to allow direct intrastate 
 
 26 See Wendy Collins Perdue, What’s “Sovereignty” Got to Do with It? Due Process, 
Personal Jurisdiction, and the Supreme Court, 63 SC L Rev 729, 738 (2012) (“Limitations 
on personal jurisdiction were addressed under the Full Faith and Credit Clause long be-
fore the Fourteenth Amendment even existed.”); Borchers, 24 UC Davis L Rev at 25–32 
(cited in note 11) (stating that “the Supreme Court decided a large number of cases on 
jurisdictional topics prior to Pennoyer” and chronicling the development of the Court’s per-
sonal jurisdiction jurisprudence). 
 27 See Borchers, 24 UC Davis L Rev at 25–30 (cited in note 11). 
 28 See Cody J. Jacobs, If Corporations Are People, Why Can’t They Play Tag?, 46 NM 
L Rev 1, 4 (2016). 
 29 See Borchers, 24 UC Davis L Rev at 28–29 (cited in note 11) (stating that D’Arcy 
v Ketchum, 52 US 165, 176 (1850), “established that the Court could enforce rules of per-
sonal jurisdiction, without any specific constitutional directive, according to principles of 
international law”). 
 30 D’Arcy, 52 US at 174. 
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challenges to state court assertions of personal jurisdiction.31 
Although the vehicle for these challenges switched to the Due 
Process Clause, the content of the rules for acquiring personal 
jurisdiction remained unchanged—a defendant must have either 
consented to personal jurisdiction or been served with process 
while physically present in the state.32 Pennoyer’s rules would 
remain the guiding principles of personal jurisdiction until the 
Court’s 1945 decision in Shoe. 
One part of the traditional narrative is undeniably true: in 
the nearly seven decades between Pennoyer and Shoe, things in 
the United States and around the world certainly did change. Rail 
travel and, later, car travel became more commonplace, and 
modes of instant communication became more widely accessible.33 
Perhaps more importantly, the corporation’s role in people’s daily 
lives increased exponentially. Corporations went from being mere 
creatures of their home states to something resembling the pow-
erful multinational entities that dominate the American political, 
cultural, and economic life that we know today.34 These shifts in 
society ended up being reflected in the courts’ dockets and led to 
many thorny personal jurisdiction problems, particularly with 
corporations doing business across state lines.35 
However, the traditional narrative goes awry in suggesting 
that the territorial system was ill-equipped to respond to these 
changes. On the contrary, the pre-Shoe system had at least three 
tools that allowed courts to adapt to these new realities: quasi in 
rem jurisdiction, consent statutes, and constructive presence. 
These doctrines were based on a respect for each state’s sover-
eignty over the people and things within its borders and a defer-
ence to state lawmaking authority in determining the scope of 
personal jurisdiction in novel situations. These doctrines also pro-
vided relatively clear rules for litigants and courts. 
 
 31 See Pennoyer, 95 US at 733. 
 32 See id. Pennoyer also retained two long-standing exceptions to these rules: the sta-
tus exception and in rem jurisdiction. See id at 722, 725–26, 734–35. The status exception 
allows a state to assume jurisdiction over divorce cases even when it has personal juris-
diction over only one of the parties on the theory that the state has authority over the 
“status” of persons within its borders (that is, divorced or not divorced). See, for example, 
Cody J. Jacobs, The Stream of Violence: A New Approach to Domestic Violence Personal 
Jurisdiction, 64 UCLA L Rev 684, 689 (2017). I discuss in rem jurisdiction, which allows 
a state to assert jurisdiction over property, in the next Section. 
 33 See, for example, Christopher E. Smith and Madhavi McCall, Constitutional 
Rights and Technological Innovation in Criminal Justice, 27 SIU L J 103, 104 (2002). 
 34 See Jacobs, 46 NM L Rev at 35–36 (cited in note 28). 
 35 See Gwynne L. Skinner, Expanding General Personal Jurisdiction over Transna-
tional Corporations for Federal Causes of Action, 121 Penn St L Rev 617, 627 (2017). 
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1. Quasi in rem jurisdiction. 
In rem jurisdiction allows a state to assert jurisdiction over 
physical property within the state’s borders to determine its 
rightful owner.36 Pennoyer’s relatively strict rules for acquiring in 
personam jurisdiction did not apply to in rem actions—neither 
personal service nor consent was necessary for a court to proceed 
in rem and adjudicate the status of property within a state’s bor-
ders.37 Importantly, states retained not only the ability to exercise 
jurisdiction to determine the rightful owner of a piece of property, 
but also the ability to assert jurisdiction over actions in which “the 
plaintiff seeks to apply what he concedes to be the property of the 
defendant [within the state] to the satisfaction of a claim against 
him.”38 This latter type of in rem jurisdiction became known as 
“quasi in rem” jurisdiction.39 
This exception to the general rule of Pennoyer not only pre-
dated the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment; it predated the 
founding of the United States.40 Its continuing vitality was most 
often justified by the ancient principle that a state has power over 
the property within its borders.41 But it was also justified as a 
manifestation of the state’s power to protect its own citizens from 
out-of-state wrongdoers. The Pennoyer Court noted that “[e]very 
 
 36 See Shaffer v Heitner, 433 US 186, 199 (1977). 
 37 See Pennoyer, 95 US at 727 (“Substituted service by publication, or in any other 
authorized form, may be sufficient to inform parties of the object of proceedings taken 
where property is once brought under the control of the court by seizure or some equivalent 
act.”). See also, for example, Arndt v Griggs, 134 US 316, 327 (1890) (“[A] State has power 
by statute to provide for the adjudication of titles to real estate within its limits as against 
non-residents who are brought into court only by publication.”). 
 38 Shaffer, 433 US at 199 n 17, quoting Hanson v Denckla, 357 US 235, 246 
n 12 (1958). 
 39 Shaffer, 433 US at 199 & n 17, quoting Hanson, 357 US at 246 n 12. 
 40 See David F. Fanning, Note, Quasi In Rem on the Cyberseas, 76 Chi Kent L Rev 
1887, 1908 (2001) (“The attachment of property might have occurred as early as 250 years 
ago, as a method of compelling a defendant to participate in the primitive trial by ordeal.”). 
 41 See Pennoyer, 95 US at 722: 
One of th[e] [well-established principles of public law] is, that every State pos-
sesses exclusive jurisdiction and sovereignty over persons and property within 
its territory. As a consequence, every State has the power to determine for itself 
. . . the manner and conditions upon which property situated within such terri-
tory, both personal and real, may be acquired, enjoyed, and transferred. 
See also Arndt, 134 US at 321: 
The well-being of every community requires that the title to real estate therein 
shall be secure, and that there be convenient and certain methods of determin-
ing any unsettled questions respecting it. . . . [T]his duty is one of the State, the 
manner of discharging it must be determined by the State, and no proceeding 
which it provides can be declared invalid, unless in conflict with some special 
inhibitions of the Constitution, or against natural justice. 
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State owes protection to its own citizens; and, when non-residents 
deal with them, it is a legitimate and just exercise of authority to 
hold and appropriate any property owned by such non-residents 
to satisfy the claims of its citizens.”42 As Professor Joseph Kalo 
noted in his detailed history of the development of quasi in rem 
jurisdiction, the need to respond to the injustice caused by defend-
ants who incurred a debt and left a jurisdiction were at least as 
much a driver of the development of quasi in rem jurisdiction in 
colonial America as traditional notions of state sovereignty.43 
Quasi in rem jurisdiction continued to be a vehicle for the 
protection of a state’s citizens from out-of-state wrongdoers a cen-
tury later when concerns about runaway debtors somewhat faded 
and were replaced by concerns about harm done by foreign corpo-
rations.44 This was especially true of one of the biggest and most 
politically powerful industries of the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries: railroads. By their very function, railroads 
operated in many states and consequently ended up in disputes 
with consumers and workers who were impacted by their opera-
tions outside of the railroads’ home states. Potential plaintiffs in 
this situation could sometimes acquire personal jurisdiction over 
a railroad by serving a railroad’s in-state agent.45 But when that 
option was unavailable, plaintiffs could turn to quasi in rem ju-
risdiction by attaching a railroad’s in-state assets—which were 
usually not hard to find because of the nature of railroads. 
For example, in Boston and Maine Railroad v Gokey,46 a 
former railroad employee who suffered a serious injury on the job 
in Vermont was able to sue his former employer, a Massachusetts 
corporation, in a federal court in Vermont by attaching two 
locomotives located in Vermont.47 The plaintiff in Gokey happened 
to be suing the railroad in the state where the accident occurred, 
but such a nexus between the subject of the litigation and the 
forum was not required for quasi in rem jurisdiction. In Davis v 
 
 42 Pennoyer, 95 US at 723. 
 43 See Joseph J. Kalo, Jurisdiction as an Evolutionary Process: The Development of 
Quasi In Rem and In Personam Principles, 1978 Duke L J 1147, 1161. 
 44 See id at 1167–71. In fact, in rem and quasi in rem jurisdiction were the only ways 
to sue a corporation anywhere other than in its state of incorporation before courts began 
to recognize the ability of corporations to exist across state boundaries. Id at 1162–63. 
 45 See Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Co v Harris, 79 US 65, 69, 72, 83–84 (1870). See 
also Jacobs, 46 NM L Rev at 15–18 (cited in note 28) (describing nineteenth-century cases 
asserting personal jurisdiction over corporations based on in-state service on corporate 
agents). 
 46 210 US 155 (1908). 
 47 Id at 168. 
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Cleveland, Cincinnati, Chicago and St. Louis Railway Co,48 the 
Supreme Court upheld the exercise of quasi in rem jurisdiction in 
Iowa over an Ohio-based railroad based on the attachment of 
railroad cars located there even when the plaintiff’s cause of 
action arose from an accident that occurred in Illinois.49 The use 
of quasi in rem jurisdiction was, of course, not limited to 
railroads,50 nor was it limited to tangible property.51 
Quasi in rem jurisdiction did have some limitations, however. 
Most importantly, a judgment could be recovered against a de-
fendant only up to the value of the attached (or more specifically, 
garnished)52 property.53 Also, although personal service was not 
required, some form of notice to the defendant was necessary in 
order to attach or garnish its property.54 Even with these limita-
tions, the continuing vitality of quasi in rem jurisdiction gave 
plaintiffs an important tool for holding out-of-state wrongdoers 
accountable. 
 
 48 217 US 157 (1910). 
 49 Id at 165, 179. 
 50 See, for example, Pennington v Fourth National Bank of Cincinnati, Ohio, 243 US 
269, 271 (1917) (allowing garnishment of bank account in alimony suit); Clark v Wells, 203 
US 164, 173 (1906) (affirming judgment in action on a promissory note to the extent the 
judgment could be satisfied from attached property); Dewey v Des Moines, 173 US 193, 
203–04 (1899) (finding attachment of property valid in suit to collect a tax assessment). 
 51 See, for example, Davis, 217 US at 179 (upholding garnishment of debts to the 
defendant held by third parties in the state). 
 52 Attachment is the seizure by the court of property owned by the defendant. See 
Joseph Henry Beale, The Exercise of Jurisdiction In Rem to Compel Payment of a Debt, 27 
Harv L Rev 107, 110–11 (1913). “Garnishment is a form of attachment in which the prop-
erty attached is not taken directly by the sheriff but is reached in the hands of a third 
person holding it. He is warned (garni) to hold the property subject to the order of the 
court.” Id at 111. 
 53 See, for example, Dewey, 173 US at 203: 
A judgment without personal service against a non-resident is only good so far 
as it affects the property which is taken or brought under the control of the court 
or other tribunal in an ordinary action to enforce a personal liability, and no 
jurisdiction is thereby acquired over the person of a non-resident further than 
respects the property so taken. 
See also Clark, 203 US at 173 (modifying a judgment that purported to reach beyond at-
tached property when the defendant was not served with process in the forum). 
 54 See, for example, Harris v City of Sarasota, 181 S 366, 369–70 (Fla 1938) (“An 
action quasi in rem requires a seizure of property within the jurisdiction of the court or its 
equivalent and service of process.”); Redzina v Provident Institution for Savings in Jersey 
City, 125 A 133, 135 (NJ 1924) (“[I]f reasonable means—such as publication in the local 
newspapers—are taken to make [an action in rem or quasi in rem] public . . . the consti-
tutional requirement[ ] [ ] of notice to parties . . . [is] met.”), citing Arndt, 134 US at 316. 
See also Herbert v Bicknell, 233 US 70, 74 (1914) (upholding exercise of quasi in rem ju-
risdiction based on service at the defendant’s last known domicile in a state). 
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2. Consent and implied consent. 
States could also protect their residents from out-of-state 
businesses by requiring them to consent to personal jurisdiction 
in the state as a condition of doing business there. The validity of 
statutes requiring consent to the exercise of personal jurisdiction 
as a condition of conducting certain activities in a state was reaf-
firmed in Pennoyer and predated the Fourteenth Amendment’s 
ratification.55 These statutes were partially justified by a state’s 
sovereign power—namely, its power to exclude foreign corpora-
tions.56 But like quasi in rem jurisdiction, these statutes were also 
justified by the states’ interest in giving their citizens a forum to 
sue foreign corporations. As the Supreme Court explained over 
twenty years before Pennoyer in upholding a statute requiring 
companies issuing insurance contracts to consent to jurisdiction: 
It cannot be deemed unreasonable that [a state] should 
endeavor to secure to its citizens a remedy, in their domestic 
forum, upon this important class of contracts made and to be 
performed within that State, and fully subject to its laws; nor 
that proper means should be used to compel foreign 
corporations, transacting this business of insurance within 
the State, for their benefit and profit, to answer there for the 
breach of their contracts of insurance there made and to be 
performed.57 
The development of this exception is often misrepresented in 
traditional personal jurisdiction mythology as something hastily 
thrown together to deal with an expanding national economy that 
the Territorial Model was ill-equipped to handle.58 While it may 
 
 55 See Pennoyer, 95 US at 734–35 (“Neither do we mean to assert that a State may 
not require a non-resident entering into a partnership or association within its limits, or 
making contracts enforceable there, to appoint an agent or representative in the State to 
receive service of process [in that state].”); Lafayette Insurance Co v French, 59 US 404, 
407 (1855): 
[O]ne of the conditions imposed by Ohio was, in effect, that the agent who should 
reside in Ohio and enter into contracts of insurance there in behalf of the foreign 
corporation, should also be deemed its agent to receive service of process in suits 
founded on such contracts. We find nothing in this provision either unreasonable 
in itself, or in conflict with any principle of public law. 
 56 See Edward Quinton Keasbey, Jurisdiction over Foreign Corporations, 12 Harv L 
Rev 1, 3 (1898). 
 57 Lafayette Insurance, 59 US at 407. 
 58 See, for example, Kevin D. Benish, Note, Pennoyer’s Ghost: Consent, Registration 
Statutes, and General Jurisdiction after Daimler AG v. Bauman, 90 NYU L Rev 1609, 1632 
(2015) (suggesting that “[r]egistration statutes developed as a solution to th[e] ‘manifest 
injustice’” created by the Territorial Model). See also McGee v International Life Insurance 
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be true that more consent statutes were enacted—and invoked in 
litigation more often—in response to the changing economy, the 
validity of these statutes under the Territorial Model was quite 
clear when Pennoyer was decided. In addition to explicit language 
in Pennoyer itself disclaiming any suggestion that the Court’s de-
cision would invalidate such statutes,59 the Court upheld the ex-
ercise of jurisdiction on the basis of such a statute in the very 
same term.60 In Ex parte Schollenberger,61 the Court rejected a ju-
risdictional challenge to a lawsuit brought by a Pennsylvania 
plaintiff against several out-of-state insurance companies that 
had appointed agents for service of process in Pennsylvania pur-
suant to a state statute requiring such appointments as a condi-
tion of doing business there.62 
The validity of consent statutes was confirmed again and 
again over the next several decades.63 And these statutes requir-
ing consent to jurisdiction as a condition of undertaking certain 
activities in a state were not limited to corporations. In Kane v 
New Jersey,64 the Supreme Court upheld a New Jersey statute re-
quiring out-of-state drivers, as a condition of driving on the state’s 
roads, to appoint New Jersey’s secretary of state as their agent 
for receiving service of process in cases arising out of any traffic 
accidents that occurred there.65 
Later, the Court allowed the assertion of jurisdiction over 
out-of-state drivers based on a statute that deemed driving on a 
state’s roads implicit consent to jurisdiction without the require-
ment of any formal appointment.66 Implied consent was applied 
to corporations under statutes specifying that a corporation’s 
failure to appoint its own agents to receive service of process 
pursuant to express consent statutes constituted implicit con-
sent to allow a state official to accept service on the corporation’s 
 
Co, 355 US 220, 222 (1957) (describing the acceptance and abandonment of “consent” as a 
basis for jurisdiction over corporations as part of a “continuing process of evolution” the 
Supreme Court underwent prior to Shoe). 
 59 See Pennoyer, 95 US at 734–35. 
 60 See Ex parte Schollenberger, 96 US 369, 376 (1878). 
 61 96 US 369 (1878). 
 62 Id at 376–77. 
 63 See, for example, Henry L. Doherty & Co v Goodman, 294 US 623, 628 (1935); 
Washington v Superior Court of State of Washington for Spokane County, 289 US 361, 364 
(1933); Pennsylvania Fire Insurance Co of Philadelphia v Gold Issue Mining & Milling Co, 
243 US 93, 95–96 (1917); Commercial Mutual Accident Co v Davis, 213 US 245, 255 (1909); 
Mutual Reserve Fund Life Association v Phelps, 190 US 147, 159 (1903). 
 64 242 US 160 (1916). 
 65 Id at 167. 
 66 See Hess v Pawloski, 274 US 352, 356–57 (1927). 
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behalf.67 The Court also approved statutes directly providing 
that any company doing business in a state implicitly consents 
to service on officers and employees of the company.68 
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes called implied consent a 
“mere fiction,”69 and that framing has been picked up in modern 
personal jurisdiction decisions and scholarship.70 However, 
whether it is characterized as a fiction or not, this rule provided 
very clear guidance to corporations in that era—if you do business 
in a state with a statute requiring consent to service, you will be 
subject to personal jurisdiction one way or another. 
Such statutes could even furnish a basis for jurisdiction in 
actions that did not arise from activities in the state where the 
action was brought. In Pennsylvania Fire Insurance Co of 
Philadelphia v Gold Issue Mining & Milling Co,71 the plaintiff 
sued an insurance company in Missouri for breach of an 
insurance policy issued in Colorado that insured buildings in 
Colorado.72 Neither the plaintiff nor the defendant was based in 
Missouri; however, the defendant had obtained a license to do 
business in Missouri.73 To comply with Missouri’s licensing 
statute, the defendant filed a power of attorney consenting to 
service of process on the superintendent of the Missouri insurance 
 
 67 See Washington, 289 US at 364 (“Admission [of a corporation to do business in a 
state] might be conditioned upon the . . . terms that if the corporation had failed to appoint 
or maintain an agent service should be made upon a state officer.”); Highway Steel and 
Manufacturing Co v Kincannon, 127 SW2d 816, 817 (Ark 1939) (applying implied consent 
motorist statute to a corporation). See also Wilson v Seligman, 144 US 41, 45 (1892): 
[A]ny state may by its laws require, as a condition precedent to the right of a 
corporation . . . to transact business[ ] within its territory, that it shall appoint 
an agent there on whom process may be served . . . [and] upon [its] failure to 
make such appointment or designation, the service may be made upon a certain 
public officer. . . . In such cases, the service is held binding because the corpora-
tion . . . must be taken to have consented that such service within the state shall 
be sufficient. 
 68 See Henry L. Doherty, 294 US at 628. 
 69 Pennsylvania Fire, 243 US at 96. 
 70 See, for example, J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd v Nicastro, 564 US 873, 900 (2011) 
(Ginsburg dissenting) (calling implied consent a “legal fiction[ ]” that “conceal[s] the actual 
bases on which jurisdiction rests”); Carol Andrews, Another Look at General Personal Ju-
risdiction, 47 Wake Forest L Rev 999, 1002 (2012) (calling implied corporate consent a 
“fictional concept[ ]”); Charles W. “Rocky” Rhodes, The Predictability Principle in Personal 
Jurisdiction Doctrine: A Case Study on the Effects of a “Generally” Too Broad, but “Specif-
ically” Too Narrow Approach to Minimum Contacts, 57 Baylor L Rev 135, 145 (2005) (call-
ing implied corporate consent a “fictional premise[ ]”). 
 71 243 US 93 (1917). 
 72 Id at 94. 
 73 Id. 
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department.74 The Supreme Court affirmed Missouri’s exercise of 
personal jurisdiction over the suit.75 The Court found that such 
consent was just as good as consent by “a corporate vote [to] 
accept[ ] service in this specific case” because consent was 
explicitly given and the language of the statute and the power of 
attorney could be reasonably construed to include lawsuits 
unrelated to the defendant’s activities in Missouri.76 
Although the Court gave states wide latitude to enact stat-
utes requiring explicit consent or providing for implicit consent, 
these statutes were still subject to some constitutional limits. Im-
portantly, unlike lawsuits involving corporations that complied 
with express consent statutes, lawsuits involving implied consent 
were limited to those that related to the corporation’s in-state ac-
tivities.77 Even when an express consent statute was involved, 
courts were reluctant to interpret such statutes to allow lawsuits 
unrelated to in-forum activities without clear text evincing an in-
tent to do so.78 And whether the consent was express or implied, 
a defendant was still required to be notified of any action against 
it through some mechanism that made it “reasonably probable” 
that the defendant would receive actual notice.79 
3. Constructive presence. 
In the absence of implied or actual consent, a corporation that 
did business in a state could still be subject to jurisdiction through 
the doctrine of constructive presence. The idea was that, if a com-
pany did “business in [a state] in such a manner and to such an 
extent that its actual presence there [could be] established,” it 
could be subject to personal jurisdiction in that state.80 Unlike the 
 
 74 Id. 
 75 See Pennsylvania Fire, 243 US at 95–97. 
 76 Id at 95. 
 77 See id at 96; Old Wayne Mutual Life Association of Indianapolis v McDonough, 
204 US 8, 22 (1907). 
 78 See Missouri Pacific Railroad Co v Clarendon Boat Oar Co, 257 US 533, 535 (1922): 
[I]n dealing with statutes providing for service upon foreign corporations doing 
business in the State upon agents whose designation as such is especially re-
quired, this court has indicated a leaning toward a construction where possible, 
that would exclude from their operation causes of action not arising in the busi-
ness done by them in the State. 
See also Craig Sanders, Note, Of Carrots and Sticks: General Jurisdiction and Genuine 
Consent, 111 Nw U L Rev 1323, 1331 n 46 (2017) (collecting cases construing registration 
statutes to not provide for jurisdiction over claims arising out of state). 
 79 Wuchter v Pizzutti, 276 US 13, 19 (1928). 
 80 Bank of America v Whitney Central National Bank, 261 US 171, 173 (1923). See 
also St. Louis Southwestern Railway Co of Texas v Alexander, 227 US 218, 227 (1913): 
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doctrines of consent and in rem jurisdiction, constructive pres-
ence was not already embedded in personal jurisdiction doctrine 
at the time Pennoyer was decided. However, contrary to the sug-
gestions of the traditional narrative, the recognition of construc-
tive presence was not a response to the Territorial Model’s innate 
inability to deal with modern developments but, rather, was the 
result of changes in corporate law that recognized the ability of 
corporations to be present in places other than their state of in-
corporation.81 In other words, changes in corporate law modified 
the way corporations interacted with other states, and the courts 
simply applied the existing Territorial Model to these changes. 
Still, the constructive presence doctrine has some roots in 
pre-Pennoyer case law. In the decades both before and after 
Pennoyer, courts recognized personal jurisdiction over 
corporations through service on corporate officers traveling to 
other states to do business on the corporation’s behalf—on the 
theory that the corporation was actually present in the 
jurisdiction.82 Although I have argued elsewhere that these cases 
about actual presence are historically distinct from later cases 
addressing constructive presence,83 they still reflect the 
Territorial Model’s approach to dealing with the mobility of 
corporations and the consistency of jurisdiction based on 
corporate presence with the original understanding of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. 
Although it had been recognized in at least some lower courts 
years earlier,84 constructive presence was not explicitly 
recognized by the Supreme Court until its 1899 decision in 
Connecticut Mutual Life Insurance Co v Spratley.85 In that case, a 
Connecticut life insurance company was selling insurance policies 
 
[T]he business must be such in character and extent as to warrant the inference 
that the corporation has subjected itself to the jurisdiction and laws of the dis-
trict in which it is served and in which it is bound to appear when a proper agent 
has been served with process. 
 81 See Jacobs, 46 NM L Rev at 13–14, 36 (cited in note 28); Roger M. Michalski, 
Rights Come with Responsibilities: Personal Jurisdiction in the Age of Corporate Person-
hood, 50 San Diego L Rev 125, 137 (2013). 
 82 See Jacobs, 46 NM L Rev at 15–18 (cited in note 28). 
 83 Id at 15–20. 
 84 See, for example, Merchants’ Manufacturing Co v Grand Trunk Railway Co, 13 F 
358, 359 (CC SDNY 1882). 
 85 172 US 602, 610–11 (1899). The concept was alluded to by the Supreme Court a 
few years earlier. See Goldey v Morning News, 156 US 518, 521–22 (1895) (“[A] judgment 
rendered in a court of one State, against a corporation neither incorporated nor doing busi-
ness within the State, must be regarded as of no validity in the courts of another State.”). 
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in Tennessee.86 During the time of the sales, Tennessee passed a 
statute requiring any out-of-state insurance companies selling 
polices in Tennessee to authorize the state insurance 
commissioner to receive process on its behalf for any lawsuits 
filed against it in Tennessee.87 The Connecticut company 
complied with the statute and filed such an authorization with 
the insurance commissioner.88 Almost ten years later, Tennessee 
passed a second statute that said that any company doing 
business in Tennessee was subject to personal jurisdiction there 
for any action arising out of such business.89 After the passage of 
the second statute, the Connecticut company issued a life 
insurance policy to a Tennessee man who subsequently died.90 His 
widow sued the company in Tennessee by serving the insurance 
adjuster the company sent into the state to investigate her claim 
(a method of service authorized by the second statute).91 
The Supreme Court found Tennessee’s assertion of jurisdiction 
in this manner constitutionally valid.92 The Court found that the 
company’s issuing of numerous insurance policies in the state con-
stituted “doing business” to a sufficient degree to make it amenable 
to personal jurisdiction in Tennessee.93 Although the company had 
ceased issuing new policies in Tennessee at the time of the lawsuit, 
it still had numerous outstanding policies in the state that it con-
tinued to collect premiums on.94 The Court also rejected the com-
pany’s argument that its compliance with the earlier statute re-
quiring appointment of the insurance commissioner as its agent for 
service of process estopped the state from authorizing service on 
other corporate agents.95 The Court found that the earlier statute 
simply imposed a condition of doing business in the state but did 
not create a contract between the company and the state that pre-
vented the state from authorizing other forms of service.96 
The peculiar facts of Spratley highlight the difference be-
tween constructive presence–based jurisdiction and consent (or 
implied consent–) based jurisdiction. The latter conditioned entry 
 
 86 Spratley, 172 US at 605. 
 87 Id.  
 88 Id. 
 89 Id. 
 90 Spratley, 172 US at 606–07. 
 91 Id at 608. 
 92 Id at 610–11, 622. 
 93 Id at 610–11. 
 94 Spratley, 172 US at 611. 
 95 Id at 618–22. 
 96 Id. 
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into a state’s market on compliance with certain requirements, 
while the former allowed lawsuits against corporations that were 
doing business in a state without regard to consent. Notions of 
consent certainly informed the courts’ creation of the “doing busi-
ness” doctrine in the sense that companies were assumed to be 
aware of the jurisdictional consequences of doing business in a 
state.97 However, the fundamental idea behind the doctrine was 
an analogy to the physical presence or residence of individuals 
rather than consent.98 This dichotomy is also supported by the 
Court’s acknowledgement in Spratley that explicit statutory au-
thorization was not necessarily required to subject a corporation 
to personal jurisdiction based on constructive presence.99 In the 
absence of a statute, there is nothing for the defendant to even 
figuratively consent to. 
One common thread constructive presence did share with 
both consent-based and in rem jurisdiction is that it was justified 
both by states’ sovereignty over activities within their borders 
and by states’ legitimate interests in giving their citizens a forum 
to sue out-of-state corporations. In Spratley, for example, the 
Court noted that “justice requires that some fair and reasonable 
means should exist for bringing [corporations doing business 
across state lines] within the jurisdiction of the courts of the State 
where the business was done, out of which the dispute arises.”100 
In the ensuing decades, the Supreme Court continued to ap-
prove the assertion of personal jurisdiction on this basis across a 
wide variety of contexts.101 Admittedly, the doctrine that devel-
oped around constructive presence jurisdiction was murkier than 
the rules governing consent and in rem jurisdiction. Nevertheless, 
 
 97 See id at 618 (observing that, by “[c]ontinuing to do business [in Tennessee], the 
company impliedly assented to the terms of [the] statute” authorizing service on any agent 
of a company doing business in the state). 
 98 See Andrews, 47 Wake Forest L Rev at 1005–06 (cited in note 70) (“Particular 
states and courts typically chose to use only one theory—implied consent or presence—but 
the Supreme Court treated both as proper. The particular theory, however, tended to im-
pact the jurisdictional consequences of the corporation’s in-state activities.”). 
 99 Spratley, 172 US at 618 (“[W]here a corporation is doing business in a State other 
than the one of its incorporation, service may sometimes be made upon its regularly ap-
pointed agents there, even in the absence of a state statute conferring such authority.”), 
citing Barrow Steamship Co v Kane, 170 US 100 (1898). 
 100 Spratley, 172 US at 619. 
 101 See, for example, Natural Gas Pipeline Co v Slattery, 302 US 300, 306–07 (1937); 
Washington-Virginia Railway Co v Real Estate Trust Co of Philadelphia, 238 US 185, 189–
90 (1915); International Harvester Co of America v Kentucky, 234 US 579, 585–86 (1914); 
Alexander, 227 US at 227; Pennsylvania Lumbermen’s Mutual Fire Insurance Co v Meyer, 
197 US 407, 418 (1905); Board of Trade of City of Chicago v Hammond Elevator Co, 198 
US 424, 442 (1905). 
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by the time of Shoe, the rules for constructive presence were much 
clearer than later scholars gave the Court credit for. A corporation 
would not be considered “doing business” in a state if it was 
merely soliciting orders for products or services that would be de-
livered in a different state.102 However, a corporation could be sub-
ject to jurisdiction if it conducted actual transactions in the 
state—even if the transactions were completed entirely through 
the mail or by wire.103 In this way, the constructive presence doc-
trine could protect consumers who had claims against corpora-
tions that were not subject to consent statutes and did not have 
sufficient property in a state to make in rem jurisdiction an effec-
tive remedy. 
Constructive presence jurisdiction, however, was subject to 
more limitations than in rem or consent-based jurisdiction. 
Although a state statute explicitly authorizing service based on 
constructive presence was not required, the Court was often 
reluctant to apply constructive presence jurisdiction when 
companies did business through subsidiaries and other 
intermediaries without explicit statutory authorization for 
asserting jurisdiction through such intermediaries.104 Also, unlike 
 
 102 See People’s Tobacco Co v American Tobacco Co, 246 US 79, 87 (1918): 
As to the continued practice of advertising its wares in Louisiana, and sending 
its soliciting agents into that State, as above detailed, the agents having no au-
thority beyond solicitation, we think the previous decisions of this court have 
settled the law to be that such practices did not amount to that doing of business 
which subjects the corporation to the local jurisdiction for the purpose of service 
of process upon it. 
See also Green v Chicago, Burlington and Quincy Railway Co, 205 US 530, 533–34 (1907) 
(finding no jurisdiction over a railroad that solicited ticket sales in Pennsylvania but 
actually completed the transactions and provided service in Illinois); Philadelphia and 
Reading Railway Co v McKibbin, 243 US 264, 268 (1917) (“Obviously the sale by a local 
carrier of through tickets does not involve a doing of business within the State by each of 
the connecting carriers. If it did, nearly every railroad company in the country would be 
‘doing business’ in every State.”). 
 103 See, for example, International Harvester, 234 US at 585–86 (approving the 
exercise of jurisdiction by Kentucky when a corporation solicited orders “which were sent 
to another State and in response to which the machines of the [company] were delivered 
within the State of Kentucky”); Meyer, 197 US at 418–19 (approving assertion of 
jurisdiction over a Pennsylvania company based on its issuance of an insurance policy 
insuring property in New York when the contract was entered into entirely through the 
mail); Hammond Elevator Co, 198 US at 441–42 (approving jurisdiction by service on a 
corporation’s agent doing business in the state even when the agent was an independent 
company that just took stock orders and transmitted them to the defendant through 
telegraph wires to the defendant’s offices in a different state). 
 104 See Cannon Manufacturing Co v Cudahy Packing Co, 267 US 333, 336–37 (1925) 
(finding no jurisdiction over corporation based on service on its subsidiary, but noting the 
absence of a statute addressing the issue); Whitney Central National Bank, 261 US at 173 
(finding that New York, “in the absence of statutory requirement or express consent,” 
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either in rem or explicit consent-based jurisdiction, a court could 
exercise jurisdiction based on constructive presence only when 
the lawsuit was related to the corporation’s activity in the state.105 
* * * 
Thus, a closer examination of the pre-Shoe era shows that the 
caricature the traditional narrative paints of an overly restrictive 
and inscrutable jurisdictional system does not stand up to scru-
tiny. Instead, what actually existed was a relatively simple sys-
tem that, while resting on bedrock principles of territorial sover-
eignty, also reflected a concern for the ability of states to use that 
sovereignty to give their citizens a realistic forum to litigate dis-
putes against foreign corporations. The system offered a bright-
line rule along with several clear exceptions that allowed plain-
tiffs and defendants alike to structure their primary conduct with 
relative certainty of the jurisdictional consequences. The system 
also allowed states a great deal of leeway in crafting statutory 
schemes—particularly implied consent statutes—to deal with the 
rise of new economic and technological realities. 
B. Personal Jurisdiction after 1945: The Broken Promise of 
International Shoe 
The Territorial Model was subject to scholarly criticism in the 
early to mid-twentieth century for resting on “legal fictions.”106 
This critique was part of an ascendant legal realist movement 
 
could not assert jurisdiction over a bank that “had what would popularly be called a large 
New York business,” in which all of that business “was transacted for it by its correspond-
ents—[ ] six independent New York banks”). 
 105 See Louisville and Nashville Railroad Co v Chatters, 279 US 320, 325 (1929) 
(“Even when present and amenable to suit [a corporation] may not, unless it has con-
sented, . . . be sued on transitory causes of action arising elsewhere which are unconnected 
with any corporate action by it within the jurisdiction.”). Some courts of the era were not 
entirely consistent on this point. See Andrews, 47 Wake Forest L Rev at 1006 (cited in 
note 70), citing Tauza v Susquehanna Coal Co, 115 NE 915, 918 (NY 1917). However, that 
discrepancy can likely be explained by the distinction between constructive presence—
which was triggered by the corporation doing business in a state—and actual presence, 
which was triggered by serving a corporate officer while in a state on the business of a 
corporation. See Jacobs, 46 NM L Rev at 15–20 (cited in note 28). The former required 
some connection between the forum and the litigation, while at least some courts held the 
latter did not. 
 106 See, for example, George Rutherglen, International Shoe and the Legacy of Legal 
Realism, 2001 S Ct Rev 347, 351–53; Cameron and Johnson, 28 UC Davis L Rev at 779 & 
n 30 (cited in note 12) (collecting cases and articles that “clamored for reform”). 
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that undermined formalist legal rules and in some cases suc-
ceeded in replacing them with more malleable legal standards.107 
Some of these scholars argued for replacing the Territorial Model 
with a test that was based on a broader inquiry into the fairness 
of asserting personal jurisdiction in each case.108 Something simi-
lar to that approach ultimately won out in Shoe, which discarded 
the Pennoyer approach in favor of the modern minimum contacts 
analysis we know today.109 
The traditional narrative casts Shoe as a turning point toward 
more expansive notions of personal jurisdiction.110 The reality is al-
most the opposite—over the course of the past several decades, 
Shoe has allowed the Supreme Court to drastically limit the ability 
of states to allow their citizens to sue out-of-state corporations. 
1. Shoe’s first steps. 
In Shoe, the state of Washington attempted to sue a shoe 
company to recover unpaid unemployment compensation fund 
payments.111 The company was based in Missouri and sold shoes 
in Washington through several salespeople.112 Rather than ana-
lyzing whether the company’s activities in Washington rendered 
it constructively present in the state as the lower court had 
done,113 the Court used this case to refashion the basic rules of 
personal jurisdiction. 
Under Shoe’s new regime, “in order to subject a defendant to 
[personal jurisdiction], if he be not present within the territory of 
the forum, he [must] have certain minimum contacts with it such 
that the maintenance of the suit does not offend ‘traditional no-
tions of fair play and substantial justice.’”114 The Court noted that, 
in determining whether this standard was satisfied, the “reason-
able[ness of asserting personal jurisdiction], in the context of our 
federal system of government” and an “estimate of the inconven-
iences which would result to the [defendant] from a trial away 
from its home” were relevant considerations.115 
 
 107 See Schepard, 32 Quinnipiac L Rev at 363 (cited in note 11). See generally 
Rutherglen, 2001 S Ct Rev 347 (cited in note 106) (describing the role of legal realism 
in laying the foundation for Shoe). 
 108 See Schepard, 32 Quinnipiac L Rev at 363–65 (cited in note 11). 
 109 Shoe, 326 US at 316. 
 110 See notes 24–25 and accompanying text. 
 111 Shoe, 326 US at 311–12. 
 112 See id at 313–14. 
 113 See International Shoe Co v State, 154 P2d 801, 812 (Wash 1945). 
 114 Shoe, 326 US at 316. 
 115 Id at 317 (quotation marks omitted). 
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Justice Hugo Black was the only justice not to join the major-
ity opinion in Shoe.116 He wrote an opinion that could technically 
be described as a concurrence because it agreed with the Court’s 
judgment117 but strongly critiqued the new personal jurisdiction 
test the Court adopted.118 He argued that “it is unthinkable that 
the vague due process clause was ever intended to prohibit a State 
from regulating . . . a business carried on within its boundaries 
simply because this is done by agents of a corporation organized 
and having its headquarters elsewhere.”119 He rejected the notion 
that there was some more “mystical” notion of presence (for ex-
ample, minimum contacts) that was required for a corporation to 
be subject to suit in a state.120 While the Shoe test is often cast as 
an expansion of state court jurisdiction, Black saw it as a highly 
uncertain test that would “tend[ ] to curtail the exercise of State 
powers to an extent not justified by the Constitution.”121 In his 
view, “the Federal Constitution leaves to each State, without any 
‘ifs’ or ‘buts,’ a power . . . to open the doors of its courts for its 
citizens to sue corporations whose agents do business in those 
States.”122 Black was concerned that the Shoe majority’s balanc-
ing test would “stretch the meaning of due process so far as to 
authorize this Court to deprive a State of the right to afford judi-
cial protection to its citizens on the ground that it would be more 
‘convenient’ for [a] corporation to be sued somewhere else.”123 In 
the decades that followed Shoe, the Court has largely proved 
Black right by repeatedly curtailing the ability of states to hold 
foreign corporations accountable. 
The first fifteen years after Shoe have often been referred to 
as the “high-water mark” of expansive personal jurisdiction.124 
 
 116 See id at 322. Justice Robert Jackson did not participate in the case. 
 117 Id at 322, 326 (Black writing separately). The opinion is simply called an “opinion” 
and is not styled as either a concurrence or dissent. Id at 322. 
 118 See Shoe, 326 US at 326 (Black writing separately).  
 119 Id at 323. 
 120 Id. 
 121 Id. 
 122 Shoe, 326 US at 324 (Black writing separately). 
 123 Id at 325. 
 124 See Robert J. Condlin, “Defendant Veto” or “Totality of the Circumstances”? It’s 
Time for the Supreme Court to Straighten Out the Personal Jurisdiction Standard Once 
Again, 54 Cath U L Rev 53, 61 (2004); Steven R. Greenberger, Justice Scalia’s Due Process 
Traditionalism Applied to Territorial Jurisdiction: The Illusion of Adjudication without 
Judgment, 33 BC L Rev 981, 999 n 82 (1992); Hayward D. Reynolds, The Concept of Ju-
risdiction: Conflicting Legal Ideologies and Persistent Formalist Subversion, 18 Hastings 
Const L Q 819, 876 (1991) (“[J]urists and scholars under the influence of the Pennoyer 
paradigm like to regard McGee as an exceptional case and the high water mark under the 
International Shoe standards.”). 
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However, a closer look reveals that even the cases decided in that 
era could have reached the same results under the supposedly 
restrictive Territorial Model. First, in Perkins v Benguet 
Consolidated Mining Co,125 the Court approved Ohio’s exercise of 
jurisdiction over a claim against a company based in the 
Philippines when the claim did not concern the company’s Ohio-
based activities.126 The Court concluded that jurisdiction was 
justified because the company had such continuous and 
systematic business contacts with Ohio that it made it fair to 
subject the company to personal jurisdiction there.127 This form of 
exercising jurisdiction would later become known as general 
jurisdiction (as opposed to specific jurisdiction, which is when a 
state exercises jurisdiction over causes of action related to the 
forum).128 
Later, in McGee v International Life Insurance Co,129 the 
Court approved California’s exercise of jurisdiction over a Texas 
life insurance company that had just one policyholder in  
California (the one at issue in the litigation).130 The company had 
assumed the policy from an Arizona company that originally is-
sued the policy but agreed with the California policyholder by 
mail to continue the policy and accepted payment from him by 
mail.131 The Court found that California, pursuant to a statute 
authorizing such jurisdiction, could constitutionally exercise ju-
risdiction over the Texas company because the contract “had sub-
stantial connection with” California, California policyholders 
would be severely burdened by having to litigate claims in other 
states, and the evidence related to life insurance policy claims 
was more likely to be in the locale of the insured.132 
These seemingly revolutionary decisions may have been pos-
sible through doctrines that existed under the Territorial Model. 
Although constructive presence–based jurisdiction did not allow 
claims unconnected with the forum,133 the Territorial Model did 
at least arguably allow such claims in cases when there was per-
sonal in-state service on a corporate officer who was engaged in 
 
 125 342 US 437 (1952). 
 126 Id at 438–39. 
 127 Id at 446–48. 
 128 See, for example, Jacobs, 46 NM L Rev at 5–6 (cited in note 28). 
 129 355 US 220 (1957). 
 130 Id at 221–24. 
 131 Id at 221–22. 
 132 Id at 223. 
 133 See note 105 and accompanying text. 
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business on the corporation’s behalf.134 Because the corporation’s 
president in Perkins was served while in Ohio on the business of 
the corporation, the plaintiff would have had a strong argument 
for the assertion of personal jurisdiction on that basis in the pre-
Shoe era.135 Similarly, McGee could have been justified on the ba-
sis of consent in light of California’s statute specifically subjecting 
insurance companies that issued policies in the state to jurisdic-
tion in connection with those policies.136 Indeed, in explaining why 
the connection between the contract and California was sufficient 
to give rise to jurisdiction, the McGee Court actually cited a pre-
Shoe decision upholding an implied consent statute.137 
That said, these decisions did suggest some new innovations 
that theoretically could have broadened the scope of personal 
jurisdiction beyond what existed under the Territorial Model. 
Perkins suggested that a corporation that carried on continuous 
and systematic business in a particular state could be subject to 
jurisdiction there for any claim at all even in the absence of in-
state service on a corporate officer. McGee suggested that the 
burden on the plaintiff of litigating in a different forum and the 
presence of evidence in a particular state could be relevant to the 
jurisdictional determination, which would indeed have 
represented a radical change from the Territorial Model’s 
defendant-focused approach. However, as the following Sections 
explain, over the next several decades, the Court would not only 
reverse these innovations, but use the Shoe test to constrict a 
state’s power to assert jurisdiction over foreign corporations to a 
shadow of what existed under the Territorial Model. 
2. The other shoe drops: purposeful availment. 
The first sign that Shoe would presage a tightening, rather 
than a broadening, of the scope of personal jurisdiction came less 
than a year after McGee in Hanson v Denckla.138 That case 
involved a dispute over the validity of a trust that was issued in 
 
 134 See Jacobs, 46 NM L Rev at 14–18 (cited in note 28). 
 135 See id at 29 (“[B]ecause the Supreme Court ‘found that the foreign corporation was 
engaged in “continuous and systematic” business in Ohio, . . . the Court was not presented 
with the issue of whether due process allowed transient jurisdiction over a corporation 
where such extensive contacts were lacking.’”), quoting Kahn Lucas Lancaster, Inc v Lark 
International Ltd, 956 F Supp 1131, 1137 n 3 (SDNY 1997). 
 136 See Cal Ins Code § 1610 (West 2018). This law was originally passed in 1949. 
 137 See McGee, 355 US at 223, citing Hess, 274 US 352; Henry L. Doherty, 294 US 623; 
Pennoyer, 95 US at 735. 
 138 357 US 235 (1958). 
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Delaware prior to the settlor moving to Florida.139 Once the settlor 
was in Florida, she continued to administer the trust, and the 
Delaware trustee continued to remit payments to her at her 
Florida address.140 The Court held that Florida lacked personal 
jurisdiction over the Delaware trustee.141 
That decision itself was relatively unremarkable, but the 
Court’s reasoning introduced a brand new requirement for the as-
sertion of personal jurisdiction—purposeful availment. The Court 
held “it is essential in each case that there be some act by which 
the defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conduct-
ing activities within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits 
and protections of its laws.”142 This requirement, which appears 
to have been invented completely out of whole cloth,143 would dra-
matically reshape personal jurisdiction doctrine by making the 
subjective intent of the defendant to target a forum the lodestar 
of jurisdiction, whereas under the Territorial Model subjective in-
tent was irrelevant. 
The immediate effect of the purposeful availment require-
ment was to reverse McGee’s holding that the convenience of the 
plaintiff and the location of relevant evidence were relevant fac-
tors in the jurisdictional analysis. As the Hanson Court explained 
in dismissing the plaintiffs’ argument that most of the relevant 
players in the litigation were based in Florida, “[A state] does not 
acquire [ ] jurisdiction by being the ‘center of gravity’ of the con-
troversy, or the most convenient location for litigation.”144 The 
Court reaffirmed the irrelevancy of the plaintiff’s interests and 
litigational convenience even more dramatically in World-Wide 
Volkswagen Corp v Woodson.145 There, the Court rejected  
Oklahoma’s attempt to exercise jurisdiction over a car dealership 
that sold an allegedly defective car to the plaintiff that caused a 
serious accident in Oklahoma,146 even though most of the evidence 
and witnesses related to the accident were in Oklahoma.147 Fi-
nally, in J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd v Nicastro,148 a plurality of 
 
 139 Id at 238. 
 140 Id at 239–43. 
 141 Id at 251–55. 
 142 Hanson, 357 US at 253. 
 143 The Court cited Shoe for this proposition, but Shoe never mentions purposeful 
availment. 
 144 Hanson, 357 US at 254. 
 145 444 US 286 (1980). 
 146 Id at 288, 298–99. 
 147 Id at 305 (Brennan dissenting) (“The plaintiffs were hospitalized in Oklahoma 
when they brought suit. Essential witnesses and evidence were in Oklahoma.”). 
 148 564 US 873 (2011). 
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the Court scoffed at considering such convenience factors lest they 
take the focus away from purposeful availment, declaring that 
“the Constitution commands restraint before discarding liberty in 
the name of expediency.”149 
Recently, the purposeful availment requirement has been ex-
panded even further to constrain the reach of personal jurisdic-
tion. In Nicastro, the plurality explained that, to satisfy the pur-
poseful availment requirement, it is not enough for the defendant 
to reasonably expect that its actions will have an impact in other 
states; rather the defendant must “manifest an intention to sub-
mit to the power of a sovereign.”150 Further, that analysis must be 
conducted on “a forum-by-forum, or sovereign-by-sovereign” ba-
sis.151 Applying those principles, the Nicastro plurality held that 
the British defendant in that case was not subject to personal ju-
risdiction in New Jersey when it engaged an American distributor 
to sell its products all over the country but did not specifically 
instruct the distributor to sell products in New Jersey.152 
But the strictness of the purposeful availment requirement 
does not end there. The defendant not only must intentionally 
target individuals within a specific state, the defendant must also 
“follow[ ] a course of conduct directed at the society or economy 
existing within the jurisdiction of a given sovereign, so that the 
sovereign has the power to subject the defendant to judgment con-
cerning that conduct.”153 Although Nicastro was a plurality opin-
ion, at least this aspect of its vision for purposeful availment was 
embraced by a unanimous Court in Walden v Fiore,154 which held 
that “‘minimum contacts’ analysis looks to the defendant’s con-
tacts with the forum State itself, not the defendant’s contacts with 
persons who reside there.”155 
Thus, purposeful availment now requires (a) a subjective in-
tent on the defendant’s part, (b) to avail itself of a specific forum, 
and (c) a manifestation of that intent directed at the “society or 
economy” of the forum state rather than just persons who live 
 
 149 Id at 887 (Kennedy) (plurality). See also Walden v Fiore, 134 S Ct 1115, 1122 
(2014) (“Due process limits on the State’s adjudicative authority principally protect the 
liberty of the nonresident defendant—not the convenience of plaintiffs or third parties.”); 
Rush v Savchuk, 444 US 320, 332 (1980) (holding that a plaintiff’s contacts with a forum 
are only relevant to jurisdictional analysis if the defendant independently has minimum 
contacts with that forum). 
 150 Nicastro, 564 US at 882. 
 151 Id at 884. 
 152 Id at 886–87. 
 153 Id at 884 (emphasis added). 
 154 134 S Ct 1115, 1118 (2014). 
 155 Id at 1122. 
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there. This is a remarkable constriction of the scope of jurisdiction 
compared to the Territorial Model, which made no inquiry into 
the defendant’s subjective intent at all, let alone one as exacting 
as this. Even the vaguest part of the Territorial Model—construc-
tive presence—considered only the scope of a defendant’s busi-
ness in a forum, not the defendant’s intent to do business or not 
do business in a particular place. 
In light of the intent requirement, the Nicastro plurality’s re-
peated insistence that the central question in personal jurisdic-
tion cases is about sovereign authority, rather than fairness, is 
puzzling.156 The source of the purposeful availment requirement 
that the plurality applied so strictly was not the “traditional prac-
tice[s]” that the opinion venerates157 but, rather, was the fairness-
focused Shoe test that the Court was interpreting in Hanson. As 
many scholars have already observed, the Nicastro plurality’s vi-
sion of personal jurisdiction eviscerates rather than elevates state 
sovereignty by considerably weakening the states’ ability to as-
sert personal jurisdiction over out-of-state defendants.158 
3. Quasi in rem jurisdiction gets the boot, but tag 
jurisdiction keeps a toehold. 
The Court’s post-Shoe attack on state authority went beyond 
its narrow interpretation of the minimum contacts test. In Shaffer 
v Heitner,159 the Court completely eliminated quasi in rem jurisdic-
tion.160 The Court concluded that the idea that a state could assert 
 
 156 See Nicastro, 564 US at 883–84. 
 157 Id at 880. 
 158 See, for example, Perdue, 63 SC L Rev at 742 (cited in note 26) (“[T]o the extent 
[Justice Anthony] Kennedy’s approach is sovereignty-based, it reflects the view that 
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Federalism, 89 Tulane L Rev 307, 324–25 (2014): 
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 159 433 US 186 (1977). 
 160 See id at 208–09. Technically, the Court also eliminated in rem jurisdiction, but, 
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jurisdiction over a dispute about property in its borders under the minimum contacts test, 
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jurisdiction over property within its borders was simply an “an-
cient” “fiction” that lacked sufficient “modern justification.”161 In 
the Court’s view, quasi in rem jurisdiction’s “continued acceptance 
would serve only to allow state-court jurisdiction that is fundamen-
tally unfair to the defendant.”162 Thus, the Court swept aside this 
centuries-old practice and declared that “all assertions of state-
court jurisdiction must be evaluated according to the standards set 
forth in International Shoe and its progeny.”163 
Shaffer is a paradigmatic example of Justice Black’s warning 
that Shoe’s malleable standard could allow a future Court to con-
strict the reach of state jurisdiction “on the ground that it does 
not conform to this Court’s idea of natural justice.”164 The Shaffer 
Court offered no real justification for its decision other than the 
Court’s view that quasi in rem jurisdiction is really jurisdiction 
over the person and such jurisdiction is unfair.165 The first conclu-
sion is questionable because quasi in rem jurisdiction allows re-
covery only up to the value of the property in question—that is, it 
does not result in a personal judgment.166 The second conclusion 
is never really fleshed out. What exactly is unfair about a defend-
ant being subject to suit anywhere that it holds property? The de-
fendant can always move its property if it doesn’t want to be sub-
ject to suit in a particular state. 
Even as the Court was in the process of removing a critical 
tool for asserting jurisdiction over nonresident defendants, the 
Court insisted that it was the Territorial Model that had “sharply 
limited the availability of in personam jurisdiction over defend-
ants not resident in the forum State,” while Shoe “increase[d] the 
ability of the state courts to obtain personal jurisdiction over non-
resident defendants.”167 Relying on this piece of personal jurisdic-
tion mythology, the Court concluded that eliminating quasi in 
rem jurisdiction would not cause substantial harm to plaintiffs. 
After Shaffer, many predicted that the next domino to fall 
would be “tag” or “transient” jurisdiction—jurisdiction acquired 
by serving the defendant with process while the defendant is 
physically present in a forum.168 However, in Burnham v Superior 
 
 161 Id at 212. 
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 163 Shaffer, 433 US at 212. 
 164 Shoe, 326 US at 326 (Black writing separately). 
 165 See Shaffer, 433 US at 209–11. 
 166 See notes 52–53 and accompanying text. 
 167 Shaffer, 433 US at 199–200, 204. 
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Court of California, County of Marin,169 the Court upheld the con-
tinuing validity of tag jurisdiction—at least in the vast majority 
of situations.170 
The justices split, however, on the reasoning for reaching 
this conclusion, with no opinion receiving a majority of the vote. 
Justice William Brennan, in an opinion joined by three other 
justices, concluded that tag jurisdiction remained valid because 
it was consistent with the fairness principles animating Shoe 
due to tag jurisdiction’s long history, which put defendants on 
notice that they may be subject to personal jurisdiction simply 
by entering a state.171 In addition, entering a state was itself a 
form of “purposeful availment” because even a transient visitor 
takes advantage of a “State’s police, fire, and emergency medical 
services; . . . travel[s] on the State’s roads and waterways; [and] 
likely enjoys the fruits of the State’s economy.”172 Both of these 
conclusions seem very difficult to reconcile with Shaffer.173 
Wouldn’t quasi in rem jurisdiction’s historical pedigree, which is 
at least as lengthy as tag jurisdiction’s,174 also put defendants on 
notice? Also, wouldn’t having property in a state also take ad-
vantage of a state’s governmental resources and economy at 
least as much as a fleeting visit? These inconsistencies highlight 
the fundamentally indeterminate nature of Shoe’s focus on 
vague concepts of fairness. 
 
 169 495 US 604 (1990). 
 170 See id at 607, 628 (Scalia) (plurality); id at 628 (White concurring); id at 628–29 
(Brennan concurring); id at 640 (Stevens concurring).  
 171 Id at 635–37 (Brennan concurring). 
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Justice Antonin Scalia’s opinion, which was joined in large 
part by three other justices,175 appeared to take an altogether dif-
ferent approach, at least on the surface. Scalia noted that, “[t]o 
determine whether the assertion of personal jurisdiction is con-
sistent with due process, we have long relied on the principles 
traditionally followed by American courts in marking out the ter-
ritorial limits of each State’s authority.”176 Instead of casting Shoe 
as a departure from this territorial power–based regime, he called 
Shoe’s “traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice” 
standard “the classic expression of” the original territorial power 
regime from Pennoyer.177 In this framing, the Shoe standard was 
merely an analogy to physical presence rather than a whole new 
way of thinking about personal jurisdiction. 
Scalia noted that the exercise of personal jurisdiction based 
on in-state service was well established in American law at the 
“crucial time” for his analysis—when the Fourteenth Amendment 
was adopted.178 From that observation, Scalia was able to con-
clude fairly easily that this form of acquiring personal jurisdiction 
remained valid.179 In his view, because the Shoe standard was just 
developed as an “analogy to ‘physical presence,’ [ ] it would be 
perverse to say it could now be turned against that touchstone of 
jurisdiction.”180 
Scalia’s methodology is even more difficult to square with 
Shaffer than Brennan’s conclusion. Scalia half-heartedly distin-
guished Shaffer on the grounds that it did not address jurisdiction 
over defendants who were physically present in the forum.181 
However, he also gets a bit more candid by admitting that his 
“basic approach to the due process question is different” than the 
approach taken in Shaffer; he “conducted no independent inquiry 
into the desirability or fairness of the prevailing in-state service 
rule” because “its validation is its pedigree.”182 As Scalia would 
have it, 
For new procedures, hitherto unknown, the Due Process 
Clause [would] require[ ] analysis to determine whether [they 
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are consistent with] ‘traditional notions of fair play and 
substantial justice[,]’ . . . [b]ut a doctrine of personal 
jurisdiction that dates back to the adoption of the Fourteenth 
Amendment and is still generally observed [would] 
unquestionably meet[ ] that standard.183 
Scalia’s approach—at least on the surface—would set the 
tools that states had for asserting personal jurisdiction at the 
time of the Fourteenth Amendment’s ratification as a floor while 
potentially allowing states to develop additional tools to assert 
jurisdiction over out-of-state defendants, provided that those new 
tools satisfy Shoe’s fairness test. But it is unclear why Scalia 
thinks the Shoe test even needs to be followed to determine the 
fairness of new procedures. Shouldn’t even new procedures be 
valid as long as they are consistent with the original meaning of 
the Due Process Clause?184 
More importantly, a majority of the Court has never adopted 
Scalia’s proposal to leave the states’ pre-Shoe jurisdictional pow-
ers undisturbed. Of course, Shaffer’s elimination of in rem juris-
diction is a major example, but so is the creation and expansion 
of the purposeful availment requirement, which has curtailed 
state jurisdiction considerably. Scalia himself joined the Nicastro 
plurality in the most aggressive framing of that requirement.185 
Despite these gaps in the reasoning of the opinions, the 
preservation of tag jurisdiction is commendable. However, it is 
likely to be far less impactful than the loss of quasi in rem juris-
diction. The main reason is that, even after Burnham, most courts 
have still held that Shoe does not allow the application of tag ju-
risdiction to corporations and other business entities.186 Because 
the actors most likely to be sued across state lines are companies, 
the ability to subject individuals to tag jurisdiction is of little use 
to most plaintiffs. Moreover, even when courts do allow corpora-
tions to be subject to tag jurisdiction, the ability to tag a corporate 
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officer in any given case depends a lot on luck, and corporate de-
fendants can more easily avoid tag jurisdiction than quasi in rem 
proceedings targeting their property.187 
4. Stomping out general jurisdiction: Daimler. 
The final and most recent weakening of state jurisdictional 
power under Shoe has been the evisceration of general jurisdic-
tion. The Court began to signal a serious retreat from Perkins in 
Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v Brown,188 in which it 
held that, in addition to having “continuous and systematic” con-
tacts with a forum, a corporation must also be “essentially at 
home in the forum” to be subject to general jurisdiction.189 Like 
the purposeful availment requirement, this “at home” require-
ment is nowhere to be found in Shoe.190 Instead, it represents yet 
another judicially invented addition to Shoe to further constrain 
state power when the Court finds it desirable to do so. 
But the severe impact of this new requirement on general 
jurisdiction did not become clear until the Court’s decision in 
Daimler AG v Bauman.191 There, the Court rejected California’s 
attempt to exercise general jurisdiction over Daimler, a German 
car manufacturer with an American subsidiary192 that had 
“multiple California-based facilities, including a regional office in 
Costa Mesa, a Vehicle Preparation Center in Carson, and a 
Classic Center in Irvine.”193 Daimler also sold billions of dollars of 
cars per year in California, making it the “largest supplier of 
luxury vehicles to the California market.”194 Yet the Court found 
that Daimler could not be subject to general jurisdiction in 
California because, despite these indisputably continuous and 
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systematic contacts with California, Daimler was not “at home” 
in the forum for purposes of general jurisdiction.195 
The Court held that a corporation could almost never be 
subject to general jurisdiction anywhere other than its place of 
incorporation or its principal place of business.196 The Court left 
open the possibility that in an extraordinary case general 
jurisdiction could still be available outside of those two places, but 
it did not specify what circumstances would warrant such an 
exception.197 Despite the multitude of contacts between Daimler 
and California, the Court in any case found that California could 
not assert general jurisdiction over Daimler because it was so 
large a company that applying the continuous and systematic 
contacts rule would render it subject to general jurisdiction 
virtually everywhere it does substantial business.198 Why exactly 
this would be a problem, the Court didn’t say. 
In a break from some other cases, the Court actually admit-
ted that its approach was more constraining than that of some 
Territorial Model–era cases. In a footnote, the Court dismissed 
the plaintiff’s reliance on two cases from that era allowing claims 
unrelated to the defendants’ in-forum activities in forums other 
than their place of incorporation or principal place of business, 
noting that they were “decided in the era dominated by Pennoyer’s 
territorial thinking [and] should not attract heavy reliance to-
day.”199 Unfortunately, personal jurisdiction mythology was still 
alive and well with the majority repeating the claim that Shoe 
“unleashed a rapid expansion of tribunals’ ability to hear claims 
against out-of-state defendants” in specific jurisdiction cases.200 
In addition to decimating general jurisdiction, many scholars 
have suggested that Daimler presages the end of consent-by- 
statute jurisdiction, at least when it comes to claims unrelated to 
the defendant’s activity in the forum.201 Even before Daimler, “im-
plied consent as an independent basis for jurisdiction ha[d] been 
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largely abandoned,”202 with courts and scholars questioning the 
doctrine’s continued vitality in the era of Shoe.203 But Daimler—
“and the dramatic contraction of general jurisdiction based on 
continuous and systematic general business contacts” it repre-
sented—suggests that the Court would be especially unlikely now 
to allow consent by statute to form a basis for general jurisdic-
tion.204 Doing so would create “a profound gap between doing busi-
ness as a basis for jurisdiction and registering to do business as a 
basis for jurisdiction.”205 Of course, that still leaves open the pos-
sible validity of consent statutes in specific jurisdiction cases, but 
that offers little solace to plaintiffs because, in cases in which 
there is a clear enough connection between the defendant’s forum-
based activities and the litigation, jurisdiction would have likely 
already been available. 
* * * 
At this point, it is worth pausing to consider how far the gap 
is between where personal jurisdiction doctrine was prior to Shoe 
and where it stands now after Daimler. Prior to Shoe, a state had 
a number of options at its disposal for reaching out-of-state de-
fendants, including quasi in rem jurisdiction, statutory consent, 
and constructive presence. Today, quasi in rem jurisdiction has 
been explicitly overruled, statutory consent is on its deathbed, 
and the replacement for constructive presence—the minimum 
contacts test—has been reduced to a shadow of its predecessor 
because of the strict purposeful availment requirement. 
To see how impactful these changes are, one need look no fur-
ther than Daimler itself. Much like the plaintiffs in BNSF that 
the Introduction describes, the plaintiffs in Daimler would have 
been much better off if their case had arisen in 1914 instead of 
2014. They could have argued for a consent theory if Daimler com-
plied with California’s registration statute.206 Or if the consent 
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statute was not construed to cover claims unrelated to Daimler’s 
California activities, the plaintiffs could have simply attached 
some of Daimler’s millions of dollars in assets in California in a 
quasi in rem action. Today, under Shoe, the Daimler plaintiffs 
and countless others like them are left with no remedy at all. 
Some who decry this tightening of the scope of personal juris-
diction call it a perversion of Shoe’s fairness standard.207 But as 
Black recognized, while “[t]here is a strong emotional appeal in 
the words ‘fair play,’ ‘justice,’ and ‘reasonableness,’” such mallea-
ble standards ultimately serve to empower judges to “strike down 
[any] State or Federal enactment on the ground that it does not 
conform to [their] idea of natural justice.”208 For too long, the my-
thology that has grown around the Territorial Model and Shoe 
has kept courts and scholars from recognizing the Shoe system’s 
jurisdiction-constricting effects and from seeing a return to the 
Territorial Model as a viable alternative. 
II.  BACK TO BASICS: THE ADVANTAGES OF THE  
TERRITORIAL MODEL 
The history that Part I outlines shows that Justice Black’s 
concerns in his Shoe opinion were quite prescient.209 The mini-
mum contacts test has made it difficult for states to exercise per-
sonal jurisdiction over corporations selling products within their 
borders and has also led to much uncertainty as different justices 
have interpreted Shoe’s vague criteria very differently.210 These 
 
 207 See, for example, Schepard, 32 Quinnipiac L Rev at 354 (cited in note 11) (“Justice 
Kennedy and his allies exploit the apparent ambiguity of the standards in International 
Shoe to justify what [Justice Harlan] Stone would have recognized as a most pernicious 
form of formalist judicial activism.”). 
 208 Shoe, 326 US at 325–26 (Black writing separately). 
 209 See Michael H. Hoffheimer, General Personal Jurisdiction after Goodyear Dunlop 
Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 60 U Kan L Rev 549, 562 (2012) (“While Justice Black’s 
vision of state power lost traction over time, his warning that International Shoe’s ap-
proach could reduce as well as expand personal jurisdiction was prescient.”); McFarland, 
68 Mo L Rev at 766–67 (cited in note 22) (“As to the [vagueness] concern, he complained 
that the Court had ‘announced vague Constitutional criteria’ and ‘introduced uncertain 
elements confusing the simple pattern’ by its new ‘elastic standards.’ He was correct. The 
years have proved him even more prescient.”), quoting Shoe, 326 US at 325 (Black writing 
separately). 
 210 Or as Black predicted less charitably, the Court has found that states lack per-
sonal jurisdiction whenever the assertion of personal jurisdiction has “happen[ed] to strike 
a majority of th[e] Court as for any reason undesirable.” Shoe, 326 US at 326 (Black writ-
ing separately). 
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issues have led many scholars to propose alternatives to, or vari-
ations on, the minimum contacts test.211 However, none of these 
scholars has actually proposed returning to the personal jurisdic-
tion framework based on territorial power that existed prior to 
Shoe, and some have decried the idea.212 
The Territorial Model, contrary to the views of critics, is not 
one focused on “accentuating the defendant’s interests”213 but in-
stead is focused on accentuating the interests of states in protect-
ing and regulating the people and property within their borders. 
This was the essential basis of the Court’s holding in Pennoyer,214 
and the concept’s origins are much older than that.215 This concern 
for the interests of states in protecting their citizens from out-of-
state wrongdoers, which has become (at best) an afterthought un-
der the defendant-focused minimum contacts test, was also the 
basis for the three key exceptions to Pennoyer’s general rules that 
Part I.A outlines: quasi in rem jurisdiction, consent statutes, and 
constructive presence. 
As I describe in the following Sections, returning to the 
Territorial Model would solve many of the problems currently 
plaguing personal jurisdiction doctrine. First, the Territorial 
Model would be much more predictable for litigants than the 
vague minimum contacts test and would empower potential 
defendants to exercise greater control over their exposure to 
liability in particular forums. Second, the Territorial Model would 
return primary power over the scope of personal jurisdiction to 
the political branches of government by increasing the role of 
implied consent statutes and decreasing the role of courts. Third, 
the Territorial Model would be much more well-grounded in a 
clear theoretical justification than the current iteration of the 
minimum contacts test. Fourth, the Territorial Model is much 
 
 211 See, for example, Sachs, 95 Tex L Rev at 1255, 1318–23 (cited in note 12) (advo-
cating a personal jurisdiction doctrine based on principles derived from “the general law, 
not as it stood in 1878, but as it stands today”); McFarland, 68 Mo L Rev at 801 n 206 
(cited in note 22) (collecting articles calling for approaches to personal jurisdiction based 
on convenience or fairness rather than minimum contacts); Wendy Collins Perdue, Per-
sonal Jurisdiction and the Beetle in the Box, 32 BC L Rev 529, 569–70 (1991) (advocating 
an approach that focuses on the forum’s legitimate interests in the dispute). 
 212 See, for example, Rhodes, 82 Tulane L Rev at 635 (cited in note 14) (“Undoubtedly, 
due to technological advances over the last 130 years, the old shibboleth of territorial pres-
ence is unworkable.”). 
 213 See Schepard, 32 Quinnipiac L Rev at 382–83 (cited in note 11). 
 214 See Pennoyer, 95 US at 720 (“The authority of every tribunal is necessarily re-
stricted by the territorial limits of the State in which it is established.”). 
 215 See Burnham, 495 US at 610–11 (Scalia) (plurality) (noting that territory- 
focused jurisdictions “had antecedents in English common-law practice”), citing Mostyn v 
Fabrigas, 98 Eng Rep 1021 (KB 1774); Cartwright v Pettus, 22 Eng Rep 916 (Ch 1675). 
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more consistent with the original meaning of the Due Process 
Clause than the current doctrine. 
A. Predictability 
Perhaps the most common critique of the current minimum 
contacts test is that it is unclear.216 The test is unclear on two 
levels. First, the test itself, at least when it comes to specific ju-
risdiction,217 is vague. It deliberately provides no bright-line 
rules and instead relies on a kind of balancing test: Are the de-
fendant’s litigation-related contacts with a forum enough to jus-
tify asserting jurisdiction over it is “fair?” Answering that ques-
tion not only requires an inquiry into the judge’s views of 
“fairness” but also a measurement of the “relatedness” of the 
contacts to the controversy. 
Second, personal jurisdiction doctrine is vague as a result of 
divides on the Supreme Court about how to apply the test.  
Nicastro is just the most recent example of this divide, with the 
Court producing a four-justice plurality, a narrow two-justice con-
currence, and a three-justice dissent that failed to give the courts 
much guidance about how to apply the minimum contacts test to 
cases involving products traveling through the so-called stream 
 
 216 See, for example, Patrick J. Borchers, J. McIntyre Machinery, Goodyear, and the 
Incoherence of the Minimum Contacts Test, 44 Creighton L Rev 1245, 1247 (2011) (“[T]he 
minimum contacts test is deeply incoherent.”); Israel Packel, Congressional Power to Re-
duce Personal Jurisdiction Litigation, 59 Temple L Q 919, 919–20 (1986) (“The underlying 
reason for the continuing uncertainty as to personal jurisdiction seems to be the inability 
of the courts to effect any specific rules; the only guidance is the indefinite concept of min-
imum contacts.”); Mark P. Gergen, Comment, Constitutional Limitations on State Long 
Arm Jurisdiction, 49 U Chi L Rev 156, 160 (1982): 
The [minimum contacts test] . . . is unpredictable, it offers no guidance to persons 
seeking to avoid being subject to a state’s jurisdiction. Each decision is too fact-
bound for general application, and the weight given to each competing variable 
is left to the discretion of individual judges. . . . [I]t is impossible for individuals 
to predict with any certainty where their conduct will render them subject to 
suit. 
See also Lakeside Bridge & Steel Co v Mountain State Construction Co, 445 US 907, 911 
(1980) (White dissenting from denial of certiorari) (“The disarray among federal and state 
courts [related to some aspects of the minimum contacts test] may well have a disruptive 
effect on commercial relations in which certainty of result is a prime objective.”); Cody 
Jacobs, A Fork in the Stream: The Unjustified Failure of the Concurrence in J. McIntyre 
Machinery Ltd. v. Nicastro to Clarify the Stream of Commerce Doctrine, 12 DePaul Bus & 
Comm L J 171, 198 (2014) (“International manufacturers seeking entry into the American 
market and the domestic distributors who sell their products have no way to apportion the 
risk of liability among themselves or to plan to avoid liability in certain jurisdictions 
altogether.”). 
 217 The scope of general jurisdiction is arguably clear after Daimler, even if it is ex-
tremely restrictive. 
1626 The University of Chicago Law Review [85:1589 
of commerce.218 That split was a repeat of a 4–4 split on the same 
issue thirty years earlier in Asahi Metal Industry Co v Superior 
Court of California, Solano County.219 In the years between those 
two cases, eight of the nine justices on the Supreme Court were 
replaced, but the divide remained, suggesting that these divides 
are not just the result of an ideologically fractured Court but also 
a reflection of the malleability of the test itself. The stream of 
commerce issue is not the only personal jurisdiction issue to pro-
duce these kinds of divides on the Court—the Court also split  
4–4 in Burnham. While Burnham’s split was less doctrinally im-
pactful than the Nicastro and Asahi splits,220 it still reflected a 
deep divide about how to apply the minimum contacts test and 
what its “fairness” requirement means—that is, whether it is just 
about “traditional” notions of fairness or whether contemporary 
ideas about fairness should also be a factor. 
The lack of clarity in the doctrine is not just theoretical. Per-
sonal jurisdiction has become one of the most frequently litigated 
issues in state and federal courts.221 This has led to litigants ex-
pending significant resources on jurisdictional discovery.222 These 
formidable costs can deter plaintiffs from filing potentially meri-
torious claims.223 Because there is often a large disparity in re-
sources between plaintiffs and defendants, defendants can use ju-
risdictional issues to increase the plaintiff’s litigation costs to 
increase their chances of forcing the plaintiff to give up or accept 
a favorable settlement—even when the ultimate outcome of a ju-
risdictional dispute is unclear.224 
 
 218 See Jacobs, 12 DePaul Bus & Comm L J at 194–95 (cited in note 216) (describing 
circuit court opinions that found that “the law remains the same” after Nicastro). 
 219 480 US 102 (1987). 
 220 Despite Justice Brennan’s opinion seeming to leave the door open, no court has 
refused to apply tag jurisdiction to a natural person on fairness grounds since Burnham. 
See Jacobs, 46 NM L Rev at 33 & n 201 (cited in note 28). 
 221 See Walter W. Heiser, A “Minimum Interest” Approach to Personal Jurisdiction, 
35 Wake Forest L Rev 915, 916–17 & n 5 (2000). 
 222 See S.I. Strong, Jurisdictional Discovery in United States Federal Courts, 67 Wash 
& Lee L Rev 489, 493 & n 11 (2010). And the availability and scope of jurisdictional dis-
covery itself is a highly contestable issue governed by malleable or nonexistent standards. 
See id at 558–64. 
 223 See Dustin E. Buehler, Jurisdictional Incentives, 20 Geo Mason L Rev 105, 129–
30 (2012) (“[L]itigation over personal jurisdiction alters the private incentives of filing suit 
because the plaintiff incurs substantial costs.”). 
 224 See id at 130 (“Indeed, when a defendant has a significant financial advantage 
over the plaintiff, it frequently uses jurisdictional issues for strategic purposes, initiating 
a costly round of procedural litigation ‘to dry out the plaintiff’s resources.’”). 
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Of course, unclear personal jurisdiction rules are not just bad 
for plaintiffs. Companies purchasing liability insurance or mak-
ing agreements with distributors must do so under the cloud of 
uncertainty that is created by personal jurisdiction rules that 
turn on nonprecedential Supreme Court opinions and individual 
judges’ conceptions of fairness.225 Uncertainty is especially prob-
lematic when it comes to products liability litigation because it 
undermines the ability of products liability law to provide a pric-
ing signal to consumers about product risk.226 In other words, the 
prices consumers pay for products may be increased just based on 
jurisdictional uncertainty rather than actual risk associated with 
those products.227 
Beyond these practical problems, there is something more 
fundamentally troubling about unclear personal jurisdiction 
rules. While a lack of clarity in any legal doctrine is undesirable, 
it is particularly problematic for personal jurisdiction to be a 
source of uncertainty because the authority to regulate personal 
jurisdiction determinations stems from the Due Process Clause. 
The Court itself has acknowledged that “[t]he Due Process 
Clause, by ensuring the orderly administration of the laws,” is 
supposed to provide “a degree of predictability to the legal system 
that allows potential defendants to structure their primary con-
duct with some minimum assurance as to where that conduct will 
and will not render them liable to suit.”228 The current state of 
personal jurisdiction doctrine does not provide defendants with 
an opportunity to do this.229 
Returning to the Territorial Model would restore predictabil-
ity to personal jurisdiction and eliminate or dramatically amelio-
rate many of these issues. The Territorial Model is governed by 
bright-line rules that leave little room for judicial discretion and 
will rarely require substantial jurisdictional discovery. Is the de-
fendant’s property physically located in the state or not? Is it reg-
istered to do business there or not? These are fairly easy questions 
to answer with minimal litigation cost. Although issues involving 
constructive presence might be a little bit more fraught, the “do-
ing business” rule is still easier to apply than the minimum con-
tacts test—if a company sells a product in a state, it is doing busi-
ness there, and if it doesn’t, it isn’t. No purposeful availment is 
 
 225 See Jacobs, 12 DePaul Bus & Comm L J at 199–201 (cited in note 216). 
 226 See id at 202. 
 227 See id. 
 228 Woodson, 444 US at 297 (quotation marks omitted). 
 229 See Jacobs, 12 DePaul Bus & Comm L J at 204–05 (cited in note 216). 
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required, so there is no need for a complex inquiry into whether 
the defendant was “targeting” the forum. 
Moreover, a return to the Territorial Model would likely bring 
back a primary role for state statutes in defining the scope of per-
sonal jurisdiction. This would come about primarily through the 
revival of implied consent statutes and statutes that specifically 
define the activities that constitute doing business. Clear statu-
tory guidance about what will subject potential defendants to ju-
risdiction will give potential defendants a path to structure their 
primary conduct to avoid liability in particular states if they 
choose to do so.230 
To be sure, a return to the Territorial Model would not elim-
inate all difficult personal jurisdiction questions. But it would 
substantially reduce uncertainty compared to the status quo. 
B. Returning Jurisdiction to the Political Process 
Moving state legislatures back to the forefront of defining the 
scope of personal jurisdiction would not just reduce uncertainty; 
it would also make personal jurisdiction rules more democrati-
cally legitimate. Under the current regime, most states simply 
have long-arm statutes that extend jurisdiction to the farthest 
reaches allowable by the minimum contacts test.231 The determi-
nation of what the actual outer limit of jurisdiction will be is left 
entirely in the hands of the courts applying the minimum contacts 
test as interpreted by the Supreme Court. 
The Territorial Model envisions a more collaborative pro-
cess. Because defendants who are not physically present in a 
state would no longer be subject to jurisdiction in the absence of 
an applicable exception, long-arm statutes that go to the limits 
of due process would no longer be effective. Instead, states would 
 
 230 Arguably, this would put a burden on companies to figure out the personal juris-
diction rules of fifty different jurisdictions. But this additional burden would be more than 
offset by no longer having to guess how the minimum contacts test might be resolved in 
any given situation. Plus, even under the minimum contacts test, there is no guarantee of 
geographic consistency. For one thing, not every state extends its long-arm statute to the 
limits of due process. See Douglas D. McFarland, Dictum Run Wild: How Long-Arm Stat-
utes Extended to the Limits of Due Process, 84 BU L Rev 491, 497 (2004). Also, because the 
minimum contacts test is so beset with ambiguities, there are many circuit splits and splits 
among state courts in how they apply that test. See Jacobs, 64 UCLA L Rev at 688 (cited 
in note 32) (“There is a split in the lower courts over whether the status exception applies 
to actions seeking domestic violence restraining orders against out-of-state defendants.”); 
Jacobs, 12 DePaul Bus & Comm L J at 183 (cited in note 216) (describing a circuit split 
about the stream of commerce doctrine). 
 231 See McFarland, 84 BU L Rev at 497 (cited in note 230). 
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be incentivized to create comprehensive implied consent stat-
utes covering different activities out-of-state defendants may 
undertake that could subject them to personal jurisdiction. This 
would allow legislatures to deliberatively pick and choose which 
activities warrant asserting jurisdiction. 
However, the courts would still have a role in policing states 
that became overly aggressive in asserting personal jurisdiction. 
But that role would not be to reject the exercise of jurisdiction 
whenever it struck the courts as unfair; rather it would be to ap-
ply the clear built-in limitations on jurisdiction the Territorial 
Model provides. For example, courts would continue to not allow 
a quasi in rem judgment to exceed the value of the attached in-
state property.232 Courts would also require actual (rather than 
implied) consent when a state seeks to assert general jurisdiction 
through a consent statute.233 Finally, courts would continue to 
block assertions of jurisdiction based on constructive presence 
when a business only solicits, rather than conducts, actual busi-
ness in a forum.234 Of course, on top of all this, courts would con-
tinue to require adequate notice before a proceeding could be val-
idly initiated under any jurisdictional theory.235 
Some may worry that a system that gives more control to 
state legislatures over the scope of personal jurisdiction will lead 
to legislators treating out-of-state businesses unfairly in order to 
help their constituents. However, this concern is overblown, espe-
cially in the modern economy. Today, so-called out-of-state busi-
nesses have far more ability to influence the political process in 
state legislatures through campaign contributions and direct lob-
bying efforts than even many state residents.236 Moreover, foreign 
 
 232 See Part I.A.1. 
 233 See Part I.A.2. 
 234 See Part I.A.3. 
 235 See, for example, Wuchter v Pizzutti, 276 US 13, 19 (1928): 
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Greenblatt, What Makes Alec Smart? (Governing the States and Localities, Oct 2003),  
archived at http://perma.cc/V4CL-P4U8; Gordon Lafer, The One Percent Solution: How 
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corporations can often use the threat of not doing business in a 
state to prevent state governments from enacting legislation that 
could hurt their business and may even have a built-in constitu-
ency in the state in the form of any employees they employ in 
those states.237 For example, if California wanted to enact a con-
sent statute that required consenting to general jurisdiction, a 
corporation like Daimler could threaten to close its numerous of-
fices in the state and put hundreds of Californians out of work.238 
That’s not to say that corporations would win every battle 
over what the scope of personal jurisdiction should be in states. 
States would return to being able to assert the full extent of their 
sovereign power to protect their citizens, and some would 
probably choose to use it. This is as it should be. While the Due 
Process Clause may protect the right of defendants not to be haled 
before a court with no authority over them, plaintiffs also have a 
due process interest in being able to have a realistic forum to sue 
companies that have wronged them. The pre-Shoe Court 
repeatedly recognized this interest, including in Pennoyer itself.239 
Even the modern Court has recognized in other contexts that “the 
Due Process Clauses protect civil litigants who seek recourse in 
the courts, either as defendants hoping to protect their property 
or as plaintiffs attempting to redress grievances.”240 The best way 
to balance these competing due process interests is through the 
legislative process.241 
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C. Theoretical Consistency: A Limitation on State Power, Not a 
Protection of Liberty 
The minimum contacts test is often critiqued by scholars for 
lacking a coherent and consistent theoretical foundation.242 This 
critique is well-grounded—most of the opinions in the Shoe era, 
including Shoe itself, have either failed to identify a justification 
for limitations on personal jurisdiction or been inconsistent about 
what that justification is. Scholars and the Court have suggested 
three broad categories of theoretical framings to fill this gap. Most 
often, scholars and the Court have cast modern personal jurisdic-
tion rules as a function of personal liberty—that is, as a protection 
for each individual against being unexpectedly or unfairly haled 
into a foreign court.243 On the other hand, many scholars and a 
few members of the Court have suggested that personal jurisdic-
tion doctrine ought to simply be a device for ensuring that liti-
gants are not forced into an inconvenient forum.244 Finally, the 
Court has occasionally suggested that personal jurisdiction doc-
trine is a method of maintaining federalism by preventing states 
from interfering with each other’s sovereign interests.245 
 
 242 See Allan Erbsen, Impersonal Jurisdiction, 60 Emory L J 1, 3–4 (2010) (“[C]om-
mentators cannot agree on the constitutional source of limits on state judicial author-
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diction serve.”); Heiser, 35 Wake Forest L Rev at 916 (cited in note 221) (pointing out the 
“Court’s failure to adequately identify the reasons for the due process restrictions on per-
sonal jurisdiction”). 
 243 See, for example, Insurance Corp of Ireland, Ltd v Compagnie des Bauxites de 
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protects an individual liberty interest. It represents a restriction on judicial power not as 
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that it is an individual right.”). 
 244 See, for example, Woodson, 444 US at 300 (Brennan dissenting) (advocating an 
approach that would focus on whether the defendant could demonstrate “actual inconven-
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jurisdiction). 
 245 See, for example, Nicastro, 564 US at 884 (Kennedy) (plurality) (citations omitted): 
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vidual’s right to be subject only to lawful power. But whether a judicial judgment 
is lawful depends on whether the sovereign has authority to render it. . . .  
 
[I]f another State were to assert jurisdiction in an inappropriate case, it would 
upset the federal balance, which posits that each State has a sovereignty that is 
not subject to unlawful intrusion by other States. 
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As the remainder of this Section discusses, each of these 
framings falls short of providing a coherent justification for the 
minimum contacts test or for personal jurisdiction limitations 
more generally. On the other hand, the Territorial Model, 
whether one agrees with it or not, has a very clear theoretical jus-
tification—respecting the territorial authority of states within 
their borders and keeping them from exercising authority outside 
their borders (as this Section discusses, this is similar to, but dis-
tinct from, the horizontal federalism rationale). This theoretical 
framework is evident in the language of Pennoyer itself, of 
course.246 But it is also consistent with the fact that the Territorial 
Model predates Pennoyer—its rules were developed in the context 
of international law about the recognition of judgments.247 These 
are inherent rules about the territorial limits of sovereign author-
ity, not individual due process rights held by defendants. The 
Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause simply gave courts 
a vehicle to apply those rules to intrastate judgments.248 
1. Individual liberty: descriptive but incoherent. 
A justification for personal jurisdiction based on territorial 
sovereignty is likely to meet some resistance. Many scholars pre-
fer an individual liberty justification. Under this conception, 
“[T]he personal jurisdiction requirement protects an individual’s 
liberty interest in not being subject to the binding judgments of a 
forum with which he has established no meaningful contacts, ties, 
or relations.”249 
This theory is consistent with the minimum contacts test’s 
purposeful availment requirement. The defendant itself must vol-
untarily make some kind of choice to make contact with the forum 
before it can give up its liberty interest in not being subject to 
personal jurisdiction there.250 The individual right interpretation 
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also finds support in other parts of the Court’s modern doctrine. 
The Court has held that personal jurisdiction objections are wai-
vable, just like other individual rights.251 And the Court’s focus on 
fairness as an important criterion in determining whether juris-
diction is present makes sense when understood as a function of 
the Due Process Clause’s protection of individuals against arbi-
trary assertions of government power.252 
But many scholars go beyond claiming that the individual lib-
erty interpretation is just descriptive. Rather, they argue that the 
individual liberty framing is logical and normatively desirable 
compared to a territorial-power framing. Professor Charles 
Rhodes, for example, argues that liberty is the appropriate fram-
ing for thinking about personal jurisdiction because courts have 
the power to compel defendants to act (or not act).253 The potential 
to exercise this power represents the quintessential restraint on 
liberty because, whatever else it means, liberty includes the right 
to freedom from physical restraint.254 Rhodes and others taking 
this position argue that state territorial sovereignty should play, 
at most, a supporting role in determining whether individual 
rights are violated.255 
Some, such as Professor Harold Lewis, have argued that 
states lack a significant sovereign interest in personal jurisdiction 
analysis.256 In his view, a court ruling on a motion to dismiss for 
lack of personal jurisdiction does not determine anyone’s “rights 
on the merits” or “resolve[ ] [ ] issues that implicate substantive 
state policy.”257 Rather, disposing of these motions really impacts 
only the interests of private parties in having a forum of their 
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choice.258 As Professor Jacob Kreutzer put it, “[I]t is highly un-
likely in most personal jurisdiction disputes that either state gov-
ernment particularly cares about the result.”259 
Kreutzer also argues that centering the personal jurisdiction 
inquiry on state sovereignty will lead to reductions in individual 
liberty because the default assumption will become that the state 
may exercise power unless there is a reason that it can’t do so.260 
In contrast, under an individual rights framing, the default as-
sumption is that the right cannot be interfered with unless there 
is some reason that it ought to be.261 Thus, if state sovereignty 
plays a central role in jurisdictional analysis, it will inevitably 
lead to expanded state power to bring remote defendants before 
its courts because the ability to exercise such power will become 
the default assumption.262 
Each of these arguments is ultimately unpersuasive. First, 
the idea that a court bringing before it a defendant restrains the 
defendant’s liberty just begs the question. The basic statement 
that a court’s ability to make a defendant do something against 
his will is a restraint on liberty is true enough. But that tells us 
nothing about the validity of the court’s liberty restraint in any 
particular case. The measure of that validity is the court’s sover-
eign authority to render a judgment in a particular case, not the 
freestanding liberty interests of the defendant.263 This makes 
sense in light of the history of personal jurisdiction doctrine—
when the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified, it gave defend-
ants a vehicle to challenge the intrastate recognition of a judg-
ment that was rendered without sovereign authority, but it did 
not change the substantive rules for determining when that au-
thority existed.264 Thus, while a restraint on liberty may be in-
volved whenever a court asserts personal jurisdiction, whether 
 
 258 See id at 732. See also id at 734 (“The sole stakes at that stage of the litigation are 
those of the parties in securing an advantageous forum or resisting an unfair one.”).  
 259 Kreutzer, 119 Penn St L Rev at 240 n 144 (cited in note 243). 
 260 Id at 238–39. 
 261 See id. 
 262 See id. 
 263 See Schmitt, 66 Case W Reserve L Rev at 786 (cited in note 158): 
In other words, defendants have a liberty interest in not being coerced by a state 
that lacks sovereign authority, just as they have a liberty interest against un-
justified coercion by other state actors. When a state court hears a case over 
which it lacks jurisdiction, it has acted without valid sovereign authority. The 
defendant can then use the vehicle of the Due Process Clause to challenge the 
state’s invalid assertion of power. Although framed in liberty, the substance of 
the individual right is therefore defined by the scope of state sovereignty. 
 264 See Part I.A. 
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that restraint is valid is a question about state power, not indi-
vidual liberty. 
Second, while it is certainly true that a state government is 
highly unlikely to have any special interest in any individual per-
sonal jurisdiction determination, it is unclear why this should 
have an impact on the scope of state authority. It would be rather 
perverse to say that states have the power to adjudicate disputes 
that would otherwise be outside of their sovereign authority be-
cause they do not care very much about the outcome of those 
cases. Moreover, personal jurisdiction doctrine’s limitations on 
state power do not primarily exist to protect some state interest 
in having disputes heard in their courts as opposed to in another 
state’s courts.265 Instead, it exists to preserve the national interest 
in the rule of law by ensuring that a state does not adjudicate a 
dispute over which it has no lawful authority, whether or not an-
other state may have any interest in the dispute.266 
Finally, the concern that centering personal jurisdiction on 
state sovereignty as opposed to individual liberty is, in part, not 
justified in the context of the Territorial Model. But to the extent 
it is, it is a feature, not a bug. It is not completely justified because 
of the clear bright-line rules the Territorial Model provides. Even 
though state territorial power is respected under the model, it 
stops at the border—a state cannot hale someone into court who 
does not consent or is not served while physically present in the 
jurisdiction unless one of the clearly delineated exceptions I dis-
cuss in Part I.A applies. More fundamentally, though, the fact 
that the Territorial Model’s default assumption would be that 
state power should not be limited would be a welcome change. The 
default assumption in all but the most suspect areas of lawmak-
ing is that state statutes are constitutional,267 and there is no rea-
son why jurisdictional statutes should be treated differently, es-
pecially when there are safeguards in place to ensure reasonable 
notice. 
 
 265 See Part II.C.3. 
 266 For instance, if Texas courts want to adjudicate a dispute between two French 
residents who have never set foot in Texas, and whose dispute has nothing to do with 
Texas, that would exceed Texas’s sovereign authority even though doing so would have no 
impact on the interests of any other state. 
 267 See City of Cleburne, Texas v Cleburne Living Center, Inc, 473 US 432, 440 (1985) 
(“The general rule is that legislation is presumed to be valid and will be sustained if the 
classification drawn by the statute is rationally related to a legitimate state interest.”). 
See also Cameron and Johnson, 28 UC Davis L Rev at 841 (cited in note 12) (“[T]he unex-
plained disjunction between the Court’s personal jurisdiction and general due process ju-
risprudence needs reconsideration.”). 
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2. Convenience, but for whom? 
Other scholars agree that current doctrine is overly restric-
tive, but their proposed solution to that problem is to adopt an 
approach that is solely based on convenience.268 They would have 
the courts discard the minimum contacts test and instead focus 
on balancing the inconvenience to each party, the location of wit-
nesses, and choice of law issues in determining whether personal 
jurisdiction is appropriate in a particular forum.269 
However, this is not really a coherent explanation for the 
way any conception of personal jurisdiction doctrine would oper-
ate. For example, personal jurisdiction doctrine is completely 
unconcerned about intrastate venue choices “no matter how in-
convenient the specific in-state venue may be.”270 It seems like it 
would be much more convenient for a defendant living in El Paso 
to litigate a dispute in Las Cruces than in Beaumont, yet only 
the former would raise a personal jurisdiction issue. More fun-
damentally, personal jurisdiction determinations simply aren’t 
about convenience—there are already other doctrines dedicated 
to that issue, such as venue and forum non conveniens.271 Ra-
ther, as Professor Stephen Sachs put it, personal jurisdiction “is 
about who gets to decide. It’s about choosing the group of people 
who get to choose the judges, to write the rules of procedure and 
evidence, to supply the jury.”272 Those choices are much more 
tied to notions of sovereign authority (that is, who can assert 
power over this dispute?) than they are to questions about con-
venience (that is, where should this case be heard?). 
Finally, a law of personal jurisdiction based on convenience 
would lead to undesirable consequences. Convenience balancing 
is arguably an even more malleable standard than minimum con-
tacts and would be at least as vulnerable to being bent to individ-
ual judges’ policy preferences as the minimum contacts standard 
has proven to be. If judges applied convenience factors in a way 
that allowed most exercises of jurisdiction, then the doctrine 
 
 268 See, for example, McFarland, 68 Mo L Rev at 801 n 206 (cited in note 22) (collecting 
sources). 
 269 See, for example, Martin H. Redish, Due Process, Federalism, and Personal Juris-
diction: A Theoretical Evaluation, 75 Nw U L Rev 1112, 1137–41 (1981); Arthur T. von 
Mehren and Donald T. Trautman, Jurisdiction to Adjudicate: A Suggested Analysis, 79 
Harv L Rev 1121, 1166–67 (1966). 
 270 John T. Parry, Introduction: Due Process, Borders, and the Qualities of Sover-
eignty—Some Thoughts on J. McIntyre Machinery v. Nicastro, 16 Lewis & Clark L Rev 
827, 855 (2012). 
 271 See Cameron and Johnson, 28 UC Davis L Rev at 843 (cited in note 12). 
 272 Sachs, 95 Tex L Rev at 1324 (cited in note 12) (citations omitted). 
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would do little more than forum non conveniens and venue al-
ready do. On the other hand, if judges applied them too strictly, 
courts could end up doing what Black feared and “depriv[e] [ ] 
State[s] of the right to afford judicial protection to [their] citizens 
on the ground that it would be more ‘convenient’ for [ ] corpora-
tion[s] to be sued somewhere else.”273 
3. Horizontal federalism: limiting state power in the name 
of sovereignty. 
Another theoretical approach that has gained traction re-
cently is the idea of looking at personal jurisdiction as a function 
of horizontal federalism—the distribution of power among 
states.274 The idea is that the scope of any one state’s jurisdictional 
power “is a function of the other states’ powers” and, thus, that 
personal jurisdiction decisions must ensure that one state does 
not encroach on the authority of others.275 This philosophical 
framing was very evident in the Nicastro plurality, which argued 
that, “if another State were to assert jurisdiction” over a company 
based in a different state “in an inappropriate case, it would upset 
the federal balance, which posits that each State has a sover-
eignty that is not subject to unlawful intrusion by other States.”276 
While it is certainly true that a defendant in one state has an 
interest that is being intruded upon when jurisdiction is asserted 
inappropriately by another state, it is unclear how the state’s sov-
ereign authority is upset by such an intrusion. States may have 
some generalized interest in protecting their citizens from unlaw-
ful exercises of authority by other states, but states do not sud-
denly lack authority over their citizens simply because another 
state exercises jurisdiction over a dispute involving one of them. 
If, for example, the State of Oklahoma had asserted jurisdiction 
over the New York–based car dealership’s dispute with the plain-
tiffs in Woodson, what exactly would the injury be to New York’s 
sovereign interests? 
Moreover, the idea that one sovereign’s authority ends where 
another begins is not consistent with the fact that, in most cases 
involving an interstate dispute, there is more than one forum 
where personal jurisdiction may be appropriate. Nor is this theory 
consistent with cases arising in an international context when the 
 
 273 Shoe, 326 US at 324–25 (Black writing separately). 
 274 See Erbsen, 60 Emory L J at 67–75 (cited in note 242). 
 275 See id at 7. 
 276 Nicastro, 564 US at 884 (Kennedy) (plurality). 
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question is whether the case will be litigated in one particular state 
or not in the United States at all. In those cases, there is no hori-
zontal federalism interest at stake. Personal jurisdiction is about 
defining the scope of each state’s authority independently of any 
purported impact that authority may have on other states. 
That said, proponents of the horizontal federalism view are 
correct that personal jurisdiction ought to be based on notions of 
sovereignty. But while advocates of this view often employ the 
language of state sovereignty, what they are advocating for is a 
regime that would place significant unwarranted limitations on 
state sovereignty. The purposeful availment requirement, for ex-
ample, puts states in a position in which they have “no more in-
herent authority than private arbitration panels and are impo-
tent in the judicial arena unless and until they have been 
empowered by the particular defendant.”277 As sovereign entities, 
states do not need to be empowered by a defendant to exercise 
jurisdiction over disputes that take place within their territorial 
jurisdiction. When the Supreme Court forced states to give up 
that authority, it did much more to upset the balance of vertical 
federalism278 than it did to preserve horizontal federalism. 
* * * 
Thus, the best theoretical framework for thinking about per-
sonal jurisdiction is that it defines the outer limits of each state’s 
sovereign territorial authority. States have authority over the 
people and property within their borders, which allows the asser-
tion of tag jurisdiction, in rem jurisdiction, and jurisdiction based 
on domicile. States also have the authority to control the activities 
that are conducted within their borders, which allows them to ex-
tract consent to jurisdiction as a condition of allowing visitors to 
do certain things in the state. In this way, the Territorial Model’s 
theoretical justifications and its doctrinal rules go hand in hand. 
D. A Return to the Original Meaning of the Due Process Clause 
The Territorial Model would also return personal jurisdiction 
doctrine to something that much more closely resembles the orig-
inal public meaning of the Due Process Clause. One of the main 
 
 277 Perdue, 63 SC L Rev at 742 (cited in note 26). See also id (“Thus, to the extent 
Kennedy’s approach [in Nicastro] is sovereignty-based, it reflects the view that states’ sov-
ereign powers are quite limited.”). 
 278 Vertical federalism is the term used to describe the relationship between the fed-
eral government and state governments. 
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techniques originalists use for divining the original public mean-
ing of a constitutional provision is looking at court decisions in-
terpreting the provision that were contemporaneous with that 
provision’s ratification.279 In the case of personal jurisdiction,  
Pennoyer was decided just eleven years after the ratification of 
the Fourteenth Amendment and, of course, is the quintessential 
expression of the Territorial Model. Moreover, as discussed above, 
Pennoyer was simply applying principles of international law that 
predated the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court interpreted the 
Due Process Clause as allowing defendants to directly challenge 
judgments that were contrary to those principles. 
Of course, a contemporaneous Supreme Court decision does 
not always end the debate on the original meaning of a constitu-
tional provision.280 However, other historical sources do little to 
cast doubt on Pennoyer’s interpretation. The debates leading up 
to the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment barely men-
tioned the Due Process Clause and did not touch on jurisdictional 
issues at all.281 While some have argued that preratification cases 
interpreting state due process clause analogues show that  
Pennoyer’s territorial rules would not have been part of the origi-
nal understanding of what due process meant,282 there were very 
few cases that directly addressed the issue, and one of the only 
ones to do so actually did use a state’s due process clause as a 
vehicle for applying territorial jurisdiction rules.283 Moreover, 
even if state due process clauses were not construed this way, that 
 
 279 See, for example, Burnham, 495 US at 611 (Scalia) (plurality) (using “evidence of 
contemporaneous or near-contemporaneous decisions” to determine that tag jurisdiction 
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 282 See Whitten, 14 Creighton L Rev at 835–36 (cited in note 281). 
 283 See id at 799 (conceding that Beard v Beard, 21 Ind (Kerr) 321 (1863), was the 
only case in the era to “directly confront[ ]” the issue and that it endorsed the idea that 
due process incorporated international norms of personal jurisdiction). 
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does not necessarily foreclose the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due 
Process Clause from having that construction.284 
While scholars may disagree on whether Pennoyer’s incor-
poration of territorial jurisdiction rules into the Due Process 
Clause was consistent with that clause’s original meaning,285 
there is “not a shred of evidence” that the Due Process Clause 
empowered judges to determine the validity of state procedures 
using a vague standard of “fairness” or through anything resem-
bling the minimum contacts test.286 Those scholars who argue 
against Pennoyer’s interpretation mostly propose models that 
would be much more deferential to state jurisdictional decisions 
than the minimum contacts test.287 For the reasons Part I de-
scribes, moving back to the Territorial Model would represent a 
step in a more deferential direction. Thus, while the Territorial 
Model may not be the most originalist interpretation of the Due 
Process Clause, it has far more fidelity to the original meaning 
than the minimum contacts test. 
Of course, not everyone finds originalist interpretative meth-
ods persuasive.288 But the original understanding of a constitu-
tional provision and the historical context in which it was ratified 
play some role in virtually all methods of constitutional interpre-
tation.289 And here, while the exact meaning of the Due Process 
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Clause as it relates to jurisdiction may be unclear, neither the 
framers of that clause nor the broader public ever envisioned the 
Supreme Court using the amendment to constrain state court ju-
risdiction with a fairness-based balancing test. No matter what 
theory of constitutional interpretation one subscribes to, this 
state of affairs should at least be reason to re-examine the current 
doctrine critically. 
III.  “MODERN CONCERNS”290 
Reviving a jurisdictional theory left for dead over seventy 
years ago naturally raises questions about how that theory will 
apply to modern technological and economic developments that 
either did not exist or were in their infancy at that time. Some 
scholars have dismissed the Territorial Model as unworkable in 
part because of its supposed inability to work in the context of 
these developments.291 However, as I demonstrate below in the 
context of two of the biggest issues that are currently vexing the 
courts under the minimum contacts test—issues relating to the 
internet and issues relating to distribution schemes—the 
Territorial Model offers a much more coherent approach to these 
problems. 
A. The Internet 
The application of personal jurisdiction doctrine to the inter-
net has been perhaps one of the most written about topics in per-
sonal jurisdiction scholarship over the past two decades.292 Schol-
ars have noted that courts have had considerable trouble applying 
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the minimum contacts test to cases involving the internet because 
of the difficulty of determining whether litigation that arises pri-
marily from online interactions relates to a particular forum.293 
The purposeful availment requirement is particularly problem-
atic because internet users are usually not “targeting” any partic-
ular place.294 
The Supreme Court has yet to weigh in on how the minimum 
contacts test applies to cases involving the internet, but many 
lower courts grappling with the issue have adopted a test that 
turns on how “interactive” a website is with the user.295 The more 
interactive the website is, the more likely personal jurisdiction 
will be found over the operator of the website in the user’s fo-
rum.296 Despite being widely employed, this test has been at-
tacked both in scholarship and in the courts for being somewhat 
subjective and not particularly helpful as applied to modern web-
sites.297 Twitter, for example, is highly “interactive,” but it would 
be hard to argue that Twitter is subjectively intending to target 
any specific state in the way Nicastro would seem to require be-
fore personal jurisdiction could attach. It is slightly easier to im-
agine an individual Twitter user targeting a particular state by, 
for example, directing a defamatory message toward an individ-
ual known to live in that state, but even that would probably be 
insufficient given the new requirement that a defendant target 
not just a person known to live in a particular state but the state 
itself.298 
The Territorial Model would provide relief from this confu-
sion. Because the Territorial Model does not require purposeful 
availment, courts would no longer need to concern themselves 
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with whether a defendant’s online activities were targeting a par-
ticular state. A plaintiff could not sue an out-of-state defendant 
based on its internet activities in the absence of personal service 
in the jurisdiction unless the plaintiff could utilize quasi in rem 
jurisdiction, implied consent, or constructive presence. Quasi in 
rem jurisdiction would be useful for plaintiffs suing large corpo-
rations with assets in multiple states. And constructive presence 
would be available when a company was actually selling things 
in a state even if it was selling those things over the internet. 
Even in the pre-Shoe era, such long-distance sales (accomplished 
at that time by mail or wire) were considered “doing business” for 
purposes of constructive presence.299 
Of course, just like under the minimum contacts test, the 
harder cases would not be those that are related to disputes over 
commercial transactions but, rather, those involving things like 
defamation and trademark violations. But unlike the minimum 
contacts test, the Territorial Model provides a clear answer to 
these questions—a default rule of no jurisdiction but with the op-
tion for state legislatures to provide for jurisdiction through im-
plied consent statutes. The default would be no jurisdiction be-
cause, in the absence of a commercial transaction, a website 
operator cannot be constructively present in a jurisdiction. How-
ever, state legislatures could pass a statute implying consent 
based on certain internet-based activities. Such legislation could 
be very broad—such as implying consent from anyone maintain-
ing a website that is accessible in a particular state.300 It could 
also be much more narrowly tailored to address issues of particu-
lar concern to the state—for example, implying consent based on 
conduct that harasses the state’s citizens online. 
How aggressive states wanted to be about implying consent 
from internet defendants would surely be a messy debate with 
many competing policy considerations to weigh. While states 
would have a strong incentive to protect their citizens from 
internet-based wrongdoing, they also would want to avoid 
creating a climate that was so hostile to internet businesses that 
the state’s citizens found their favorite websites no longer 
accessible.301 The balance that each state ultimately strikes will 
likely not be satisfying to some group or another, but at least it 
will be the product of the democratic process rather than the 
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whims of judges. Moreover, legislation is much more easily 
subject to revision than constitutional doctrine. As technology 
evolves and states discover what works effectively, implied 
consent laws can be changed to strike a better jurisdictional 
balance. 
B. Distribution Schemes 
Another issue that has been difficult for courts to deal with 
under the minimum contacts test is the one that split the 
Supreme Court in Nicastro—cases involving distribution schemes 
and the so-called stream of commerce.302 Like the internet cases, 
the purposeful availment requirement has proven difficult to 
apply in this context. Some courts require a plaintiff suing an out-
of-state product manufacturer to demonstrate that the 
manufacturer intentionally targeted that specific state before 
personal jurisdiction can attach.303 Others don’t explicitly require 
such targeting but do require a demonstration that the defendant 
should have known that its products would reach the state 
through the stream of commerce.304 Courts also struggle with 
whether to count contacts that a defendant’s subsidiary or 
distributor has with a state in determining whether the 
defendant has sufficient contacts with a forum.305 
These issues become particularly pronounced when they ap-
pear (as they often do) in the same case: a foreign manufacturer 
creates a domestic subsidiary for the purpose of distributing its 
products in the United States but without any specific direction 
to sell in a particular state. Does the sale of those products into a 
specific state constitute sufficiently purposeful availment of that 
state by the manufacturer because the manufacturer can hon-
estly say they did not specifically target that state? And if specific 
targeting is required, is it enough that the subsidiary did the tar-
geting or does the manufacturer itself have to do it? 
The minimum contacts test does not provide clear answers to 
either of these questions, and the ones that have been suggested 
 
 302 See generally Jacobs, 12 DePaul Bus & Comm L J 171 (cited in note 216). See also 
Buehler, 20 Geo Mason L Rev at 111–20 (cited in note 223). See also generally Danielle 
Tarin and Christopher Macchiaroli, Refining the Due-Process Contours of General Juris-
diction over Foreign Corporations, 11 J Intl Bus & L 49 (2012). 
 303 See Jacobs, 12 DePaul Bus & Comm L J at 183, 194–97 (cited in note 216). 
 304 Id. 
 305 See, for example, Bauman v DaimlerChrysler Corp, 676 F3d 774, 778 (9th Cir 
2011) (O’Scannlain dissenting from the denial of rehearing en banc) (describing the differ-
ent approaches to this issue taken in different circuits). 
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are unsatisfactory. With the targeting issue, the Nicastro plural-
ity’s strict actual intent test would require extensive jurisdic-
tional discovery to determine a company’s motives with respect to 
specific states306 and would give companies a road map to easily 
avoid personal jurisdiction, even in states where they sell lots of 
products, simply by targeting some more general geographic re-
gion rather than a specific state. A constructive knowledge test, 
on the other hand, would give companies too little certainty about 
the jurisdictional results of their conduct because the determina-
tion would ultimately turn on each judge’s relatively uninformed 
opinion about whether a company should have known where its 
products would be sold. With respect to subsidiaries, most courts 
will not impute the contacts created by a subsidiary to a parent 
company unless the parent company exercises such control over 
the subsidiary as to render it the parent’s alter ego.307 
These issues would largely vanish under the Territorial 
Model. Just like in the internet context, under the Territorial 
Model much of the responsibility for determining how to handle 
distribution chains would shift from the judiciary to state legisla-
tures. An out-of-state manufacturer who sells products into a 
state through a distributor would generally not be subject to  
personal jurisdiction there in the absence of personal service in 
the jurisdiction. However, a state could provide by statute that 
selling products into the state through a distributor (whether the 
distributor is independent or a subsidiary) constitutes consent to 
 
 306 See, for example, In re Testosterone Replacement Therapy Products Liability 
Litigation Coordinated Pretrial Proceedings, 136 F Supp 3d 968, 975 (ND Ill 2015) 
(“[D]etermining whether Besins S.A. can be properly haled into this Court would require 
more information about, for example, the volume of AndroGel sales or revenue derived in 
particular states, or the underlying basis for Besins S.A.’s expectations about the 
‘consequences’ its acts would have in those states.”). See also Toys “R” Us, Inc v Step Two, 
SA, 318 F3d 446, 457 (3d Cir 2003) (requiring jurisdictional discovery on the ground that 
it “may shed light on [the defendant’s] intentions with respect to the US market”); 
Cassandra Burke Robertson and Charles W. “Rocky” Rhodes, The Business of Personal 
Jurisdiction, 67 Case W Reserve L Rev 775, 802 (2017) (“[B]road discovery may be 
necessary now to give plaintiffs some opportunity to present evidence on new jurisdictional 
theories in an attempt to satisfy an uncertain governing standard.”). 
 307 See Bauman, 676 F3d at 778 (O’Scannlain dissenting from the denial of rehearing 
en banc) (describing the different approaches to this issue taken in different circuits). 
Some courts will impute the contacts of a subsidiary to a parent if the subsidiary is acting 
as the parent’s agent, but even then the test is usually a much more stringent one than 
what is required for a typical agency relationship and essentially ends up being the same 
as the alter ego test. See Greenfield Energy, Inc v Duprey, 252 SW3d 721, 733 (Tex App 
2008) (“Generally, whether one describes the theory for imputing one corporation’s con-
tacts to another as a theory of agency or alter ego, the critical test remains that of the right 
or exercise of control.”). 
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personal jurisdiction in the forum.308 Just like in the internet con-
text, determining how far these consent statutes should go would 
require delicate weighing of competing policy considerations—a 
job much better suited to legislatures than the courts. 
Even with the immense influence that large out-of-state busi-
nesses are now able to wield over state legislatures, some may 
fear that smaller businesses could be harmed by allowing states 
virtually unlimited reach into a product’s distribution chain. For 
example, an individual artisan may make widgets that it sells to 
a large distributor who then sells such widgets to customers all 
over the country. Wouldn’t it be unfair for an implied consent stat-
ute to require the artisan to consent to jurisdiction in some dis-
tant state when she has no control over where her products will 
be sold by the large distributor? 
There are two rebuttals to this concern. First, the switch to a 
jurisdictional regime with certainty—one based on readily ascer-
tainable statutes—would allow the actors involved in such trans-
actions to structure their primary conduct to avoid such problems. 
A large distributor under the Territorial Model would probably 
have more success attracting small producers if its contracts pro-
vided for indemnification or allowed producers to limit the states 
where their goods would be sold. Second, as a practical matter, at 
least in products liability cases, a prospective plaintiff is much 
more likely to want to sue a large-pocketed distributor than a 
small-time producer anyway. 
On the other hand, one could argue that the Territorial Model 
could be hard on plaintiffs in states that do not choose to adopt 
implied consent statutes that apply to “up the chain” manufactur-
ers. However, those plaintiffs would still have the option of using 
quasi in rem jurisdiction to attach the manufacturers’ in-state as-
sets. Such assets would be readily available in cases in which the 
defendant utilizes an in-state distributor, especially if the in-state 
distributor is a subsidiary because the subsidiary would itself be 
an in-state asset of the manufacturer. Of course, there may be 
situations, like Nicastro, in which the distributor is also not based 
in the state where the plaintiff wants to sue. But ultimately, those 
plaintiffs would still have more options available to them to find 
 
 308 See Cannon Manufacturing Co v Cudahy Packing Co, 267 US 333, 336–37 (1925) 
(refusing to assert “doing business” jurisdiction over a corporation based on the activities 
of its subsidiary but noting the absence of a state or federal statute addressing the issue). 
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a way to assert jurisdiction in an amenable forum than they 
would under the minimum contacts test.309 
* * * 
Certainly, questions about how personal jurisdiction applies 
to the internet and distribution schemes raise difficult issues 
about where lawsuits ought to take place and who should bear 
the burden of litigating in an inconvenient forum. But whatever 
the right answers to these questions are, having clear answers is 
preferable to having amorphous ones. And having these questions 
decided through the democratic process, rather than by judges, 
will allow the answers to have greater legitimacy and flexibility 
as the economy continues to evolve. 
CONCLUSION 
Many practitioners, judges, and academics have long la-
mented that personal jurisdiction doctrine is a mess. But in order 
to fix what is wrong with that doctrine, we must first clear away 
the edifice of mythology on which the minimum contacts doctrine 
rests. Whatever its drafters may have intended, Shoe did not 
mark a pragmatic triumph ushering in a new flexible era of per-
sonal jurisdiction. Instead, its open-ended balancing test opened 
the door to decades of unwarranted judicial invasion of the states’ 
sovereign authority to define the jurisdictional consequences of 
activities that take place within their borders. Returning to the 
Territorial Model would finally give personal jurisdiction the doc-
trinal clarity, theoretical consistency, and democratic and consti-
tutional legitimacy it has been lacking. 
 
 309 For example, they could probably sue in the state where the distributor is based 
or in another state that requires actual consent to personal jurisdiction for actions that do 
not arise in the state. 
